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Abstract 
 
In response to the alarming rate of deforestation and forest degradation caused by illegal 
forest activities in Southern Tanzania, a collaborative civil society initiative called Mama 
Misitu was set up to raise awareness at village level regarding good forest governance and to 
support the implementation of participatory forest management (PFM). This study looks at 
how raised awareness may influence the key factors of good governance; participation, 
accountability and legal enforcement. The study also aims to examine perceptions among 
villagers in forest adjacent communities where Mama Misitu has been working, in relation to 
forest value, corruption and local ownership of the forest.  
 
The study found that villagers emphasize conservational values of the forest, but seem 
unaware of its market value. Despite this lack of awareness, villagers seem to have a strong 
sense of ownership of the local forest. Corruption in the forest sector is perceived to be a local 
problem, and the majority of the villagers interviewed believe they can have an impact in the 
effort to curbing corruption. The study further concludes that awareness raising will have a 
positive effect on forest governance, strengthening the local institutions and their power 
relations with other forest stakeholders.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Illegal forest activities are inflicting disturbing pressure on forest land in Southern Tanzania. 
Weak forest governance has been unable to prevent the exploitation of forest resources. This 
study looks at a campaign called Mama Misitu, initiated by civil society organisations, and 
aiming to raise awareness in forest adjacent villages in the hope to bring about improvements 
in forest governance. 
 
The introductory chapter illuminates the background information motivating the study. 
Further, the objective of the study, the problem statement, and the key research questions are 
presented. 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
As many other countries rich in forests, Tanzania has experienced high rates of deforestation 
and forest degradation during the last two decades. Between 1990 and 2005 deforestation was 
estimated to 412,000 ha per annum (FAO 2010). But unlike most other forest rich countries, 
illegal encroachment and charcoal production are believed to be more important causes for 
deforestation than illegal commercial logging (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009b:6). In 
Tanzania more than 1 million urban households depend on charcoal as primary source of 
energy. Hundreds of thousands Tanzanians depend on income from small scale charcoal 
production or trade of such. It is estimated that more than 80% of the charcoal supply is 
illegally harvested, causing large revenue losses. To pursue illegal charcoal production would 
thus add income to the authorities, but the consequences for those losing their income or for 
the users as supply would decrease and prices increase could be dramatic. Monitoring 
charcoal supply is also extremely difficult as there are no simple means to mark charcoal as 
legal (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009b). The forests in Tanzania are mainly of low 
timber value density, and easy to access (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009b).  Lack of 
forest management plans, „open-access‟ policies, population growth and inefficient marked 
regulation have increased the pressure on forest land (Blomley and Iddi 2009). The market for 
forest produce is characterized by many small companies, individual traders and middlemen 
(Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009b). This puts Tanzania in a challenging situation 
when it comes to forest management.  
2 
 
 
In an attempt to decrease unsustainable depletion of forest resources the Government of 
Tanzania has taken several measures. The National Forest Policy of 1998, the National Forest 
Programme 2001-2010, and the Forest Act 2002 all encourage substantial decentralisation of 
forest management (URT 1998, 2002). It has been recognised that the authorities, central and 
local, are unable to administer the vast areas of forests without cooperating with the 
neighbouring communities. By giving these communities legal jurisdiction over the land the 
aim is to promote participation and local engagement in forest management (Blomley and Iddi 
2009:9).  
 
Tanzania was one of the first African countries to recognize local governance in the forestry 
sector. With pilot projects starting in the early 1990s, Tanzania is considered a leader on the 
continent with regard to participatory forest management (PFM) implementation (Tanzania 
Forest Conservation Group 2007). Initially PFM was driven by conservational interests. Later 
PFM increasingly was seen as a means to improve local livelihood and to reduce poverty 
(Schreckenberg and Luttrell 2009).The National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of 
Poverty (2005), MKUKUTA in Swahili, further emphasizes the poverty alleviating purposes 
of PFM (URT 2005).  
 
Establishing PFM is an ongoing process in Tanzania. A national survey from 2006 shows that 
of the approximately 35 million ha forest in Tanzania, 3,67 million ha was engaged in PFM 
(Blomley and Ramadhani 2007). As Fig. 1 illustrates, this figure will be higher today. 
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Fig 1. Expansion of PFM from 1999-2008. 
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Source: URT 2009 Participatory Forest Management in Tanzania 1993-2009, Blomley and Iddi. 
 
 
Despite ample legal frameworks and ongoing efforts to decentralize forest governance, the 
exploitation of forest resources has continued.  In 2007 Milledge et al in TRAFFIC, a wildlife 
trade monitoring network, released a report revealing widespread illegal logging, collusion 
among influential actors, massive revenue shortfalls and a chronic nature of petty corruption 
within the forest sector in Southern Tanzania. At village level there was persistent 
underestimation of the value of the logs, with local harvesters receiving as little as one per 
cent of the export price. Local government authorities lost substantial royalty income, 
collecting a mere 4% of potential revenue. Petty corruption, nocturnal transport and the 
“white washing” of illegally harvested timber by fraudulent documentation, made the 
situation difficult to control (Milledge et al 2007).  
 
The underperformance of forest governance was not only due to capacity constraints. Rather, 
it was evidenced that powerful actors cynically exploited the system. Lack of awareness at 
community level, inadequacy in forest management, globalisation and the delay in 
implementation of forest sector institutional reforms, enabled high-ranked forestry officials in 
cooperation with domestic and foreign organised networks to benefit from illegal harvesting. 
Extensive informal linkages were found between senior government officials and timber 
traders and exporters. The completion of the Mkapa bridge across the Rufiji river in 2003, 
made this area of Southern Tanzania more accessible to the buyers of forest produce.  The 
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combination of lack of awareness among local population and weak law enforcement, made 
the area attractive for both national and foreign traders. Beside the economic shortfalls 
affecting the forest adjacent communities, the forests were also depleted at an unsustainable 
rate, jeopardizing the livelihood for future generations, as well as posing long-lasting negative 
effects on the environment (Milledge et al 2007). 
 
The massive extent of illegitimate activities and governance shortfalls within the forestry 
sector exposed in the TRAFFIC report were not new information, but it was well documented 
and increased the focus and attention to the problem
1
. Additional exposure in media also 
made it easier to attract donor funding to activities dealing with the weaknesses uncovered by 
the report. Under the umbrella of the Tanzania Natural Resource Forum, 17 civil society 
organisations (CSO) holding jointly over 10 years of project implementation experience in 
Tanzania, many of which were related to the forestry sector, decided to run an awareness 
raising campaign addressing some of the issues revealed in the TRAFFIC report
2
. The 
campaign was named Mama Misitu (Mother Forest in Swahili) (Mama Misitu PIU 2008). 
 
 
1.2 Aim of the study 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether awareness raising  campaigns such as the 
Mama Misitu initiative are effective mechanisms to improving forest governance at the local 
level in Tanzania, and to what extent poor people may benefit from such initiatives. 
 
 
1.3 Problem statement and research questions 
 
Illegal forest activities and loss of forest and income deprive poor and forest adjacent 
communities in Tanzania of valuable resources (Milledge et al 2007). Generally, there is a 
lack of transparency in forest governance, poor downwardly accountability by forest officers 
and ignorance of forest laws and regulations by both local authorities and community 
members (Blomley & Iddi 2009). Combined with a weak capacity at the national, district and 
community levels to implement good forest management, forestry resources have been 
                                                 
1
 Interview with consultant 13.11.2009 
2
 A presentation of the partners is included in Annex 2. 
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captured by unscrupulous individuals and companies (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 
2009a). Corruption, slow implementation of participatory forest management and foot 
dragging in law enforcement, make this problem difficult to solve.  
 
Will increased awareness by people living in forest adjacent communities in Tanzania lead to 
improved forest governance that also benefit the poor? The key questions addressed by the 
thesis are: 
 
• Is the Mama Misitu campaign focusing on the relevant information and how is the 
flow of information? 
• Does access to information empower the local communities with regard to forest 
management? 
• Are there mechanisms in place whereby local communities can act on the information 
received to improve forest management? 
• Are there legal enforcement systems in place which can/will act on the information 
received? 
 
1.4 Structure of thesis 
 
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework for the thesis. Key concepts are introduced and 
explained, and the background information needed for the study is elaborated. In chapter 3 I 
present the research methods and provide a brief introduction to the study area. Chapter 4 
presents the findings and results of my fieldwork, whereas in chapter 5 I discuss the findings 
in relation to key concepts of good forest governance. Finally, in chapter 6 my conclusions are 
summarized.   
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2 Theoretical approaches 
 
In this chapter I will first clarify the theoretical foundation of my study before the main 
concepts which are central for this thesis are elaborated. Thereafter, I will give a brief outline 
of forest policy in Tanzania, including a short presentation of participatory forest 
management. I then discuss the background of and lessons from various awareness raising 
campaigns in developing countries, before I give a more detailed description of the Mama 
Misitu awareness raising campaign which is the focus of the thesis. 
 
 
2.1 Theoretical foundation 
 
To identify a theoretical framework to use in my analysis I have looked at the theories of 
Political Economy, Political Ecology and New Institutionalism. 
  
Political economy is the science of how a country is governed, the relationships between 
individuals and society and between markets and the state, considering economic and political 
factors (Britannica Online Encyclopedia). Pioneer philosophers within this science were 
Adam Smith, David Hume and Francois Quesnay who at the mid 18
th
 century ascribed the 
distribution of wealth to political, economic, technological, natural and social factors, rather 
than being the fate of Gods will. Political economy is a normative field of study. In the 
context of management of natural resources political economy focuses on the politics of 
resource allocation and extraction  among competing people and interest groups in the society 
(Boyce 2002:7).  
 
Political Ecology integrates the ecology and political economy perspectives (Blakie & 
Brookfield 1987). It focuses on “power relations in land and environmental management at 
various geographical levels, from the local via the national to the global, and the interlinkages 
between these levels” (Benjaminsen et al 2009:4).  The tension of conflicting interests goes 
both between society and nature as well as between various groups within the society (Blaikie 
and Brookfield 1987:17). Political Ecology is a normative field of study with a special focus 
on marginalized people. It uses critical perspectives and aim to deconstruct hegemonic 
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narratives around degradation and marginalization, environment conflicts, conservation and 
control, and environmental identity and social movements (Robbins 2004).  
 
New institutionalism examines the impact of institutions, such as rules, regulations, norms 
and values, on social, economic and political behaviour (Andersson et al. 2005). Institutions 
provide bonds between community members and create an element of order and predictability 
(March and Olsen 2005). Through the provision of incentives or sanctions, institutions may 
influence choices of action in order to reduce opportunism and reinforce socially productive 
behaviour (Bates 1989). With regard to decentralization of forest governance, Andersson, 
Gibson and Lehoucq (2005) argue that local politicians will engage in forest management if 
they reap political or financial benefits by doing so. They look at the following conditions;   
- The degree of fiscal and/or regulatory power granted to the local government.  
- The strength of demands from local interest groups and hence the chance of politicians 
to be re-elected.  
- Central government support and supervision. Central government can provide 
resources for the policy or impose costs for non-compliance.  
 
In a new institutionalism‟ perspective the management of common forest resources will thus 
be guided by institutions, and the actors‟ perception of potential costs and benefits within 
these. 
 
2.1.1 “The Tragedy of Open Access” 
 
Garret Hardin described in 1968 how free access to common land will lead to degradation. As 
each individual will get the full benefit of the resources he/she extracts, the cost of loosing 
these resources will be carried by the whole community. This rationale will encourage 
excessive extraction of resources and thus lead to degradation. Elinor Ostrom, among others, 
later argued that communities would protect their commons by developing institutional 
arrangements, and that Hardin‟s “Tragedy of the commons” rather would apply to open 
access resources, which are free to all and where rules for use do not exist (Boyce 2002)  
 
With the view of new institutionalism, institutions would help to prevent such exploitation of 
resources by providing information about other actors, limiting the choices of action or 
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structuring interaction between the actors. In this way uncertainty is reduced and the 
likelihood for collective arrangements in order to ensure optimal use are increased (North in 
Gibson 1999:10). 
 
In a political economy perspective, open access to resources is not equally available to 
everybody. The process of extracting the resources will usually require investments and will 
thus be more available to wealthier actors than to the poor. Access to nature capital is further 
filtered through political and economic institutions, favouring the wealthy possessing 
relatively more power than the poor and powerless. Equally, the negative consequences of 
environmental, or for this thesis‟ case, forest, degradation will be unevenly distributed as the 
poor more often will depend on the forest to sustain their livelihood, and thus will be harsher 
affected by its degradation. For the richer actors incentives for environmental protection will 
be a trade-off between personal profits, the longer term desire for sustainable resource 
extraction, and the wish for environmental conservation. Frequently many of the actors 
benefiting from extracted resources are physically distant from the source, and do thus not 
directly carry the cost of degradation themselves (Boyce).  
 
Boyce (2002:4) suggests three possible explanations how this unequal distribution of benefits 
and costs between „winners‟ and „losers‟ is possible: 
- the losers may belong to future generations and are not able to defend themselves, 
- the losers lack information or are unaware of the problem, and do therefore not 
raise resistance, 
- the losers are aware of the problem, but they lack the means to defend themselves 
against the winners imposing environmental costs on them. 
 
Whereas the first explanation may call for the exploiters‟ sense of responsibility, the second 
demand awareness and access to information. For the third, available mechanisms for holding 
the winners accountable will be essential. In this regard power relations will be very important 
and I will therefore briefly discuss this concept. 
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2.1.2 The notion of power 
 
Power is a relational and dynamic notion. Nuijten (2005) has by following Lemke (2003) 
identified three types of power relations. First, there is power as strategic games, where an 
actor will try to manipulate possible actions of others. Examples can be moral advice, 
ideological manipulation, economic exploitation or sensible argumentation. Second, there is 
institutional power, such as rules, principles and laws, which is a more systematic and rational 
regulation of conduct of the various actors. Finally, there is the structural power, which 
reflects domination achieved through hierarchy and structural subordination. This latter form 
of power relation is often rigid and more difficult to change (Nuijten 2005) 
 
A comparable understanding of power as strategic games can be found in Raik et al (2008). 
With their agent-centred understanding, power has two dimensions, coercion and constraint. 
The former implies that one agent holds power to force another to do something, whereas the 
latter implies that the agent can prevent another from doing something. In order to also 
consider social conditions another dimension of power is added, - the structural view. 
Following this view, power exists outside of the individual and evolves by the individual‟s 
position in the social structure. Examples of such influencing factors can be gender, race and 
class. By combining the agent-centred and the structural view, Raik et al (2008) present a 
realist view, where power evolves from both social position as well as individual qualities. 
  
In reality the formal and identifiable power structure of an organisation, a community or 
within natural resource management, rarely reflects how the power relations work in practice. 
Rules and democratic procedures are often replaced by informal relationships, decisions taken 
outside the board room and information sharing in undefined circles, which make up an 
informal and often different power structure (Nuijten 2005). Corruption and powerful 
alliances may also circumvent formal rules and regulations, in favour of those with privileged 
access to economic or political power and strategic information (Benjaminsen & Lund 2003). 
  
Decentralisation in natural resource management involves changes in existing power 
relations. New actors and new institutions come about through local participation. Natural 
resource management require technical expertise, but also good skills in such fields as 
negotiation, discussion, persuasion, communication and decision making (Brechin et al 2003 
in Raik et al 2008). Benjaminsen and Svarstad (2010) have identified nine different means 
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that actors may possess to obtain power in environmental management. They include direct 
and indirect, structural, strategic and institutional dimensions of power, and are available to 
stakeholders to various extents. 
 
- Economic resources may have influence on economic development. Private 
company owners and NGOs are examples of actors holding such power. 
- Land rights and entitlements may give the power to regulate or restrict the use of 
land. The acquisitions of land rights by external actors have in many areas 
excluded the local population from the use of resources. 
- Political power influences political decisions. The shaping of legislation, 
regulations and budgets are examples of the use of such power.  
- Influence over public administration. Such influence can be exerted by political 
actors, private companies or the bureaucracy. Strategically placed employees may 
misuse their position to their own interest.  
- Discursive power and persuasion. By eloquent expressiveness decision makers can 
be influenced. 
- Information. Unequal access to information may change the basis for decision 
making, giving advantages to actors controlling the flow of information.  
- Violence and coercion can be exercised by state actors within and outside the law, 
by large organisations, rebels and by criminals. 
- Passive resistance - the weapons of the weak (Scott 1985). People appear to play 
along, but resist by disobedience, obstruction, sabotage or foot dragging.   
- Individual characteristics such as gender, class, nationality, age and ethnicity, may 
give different influencing capacity.   
 
Many of these types of power identified by Benjaminsen and Svarstad can be seen as means 
to obtain the dimensions of power described by Boyce (2002). He views the following 
dimensions of power as relevant to the stakeholders‟ influence on environmental 
management;  
- Purchasing power is the base for evaluation of environmental goods and services, 
and influences what gets produced. 
- Decision power is the ability of influencing decisions in your best interest. 
- Agenda power is the ability to decide what topics to include or exclude from the 
agenda. 
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- Value power is the ability to influence the objectives and desires of others. 
- Event power is the ability to influence circumstances around the decision which 
are to be made, and in this way manipulate the outcome of the decision. 
 
For this thesis it is of interest to identify the dimensions of power relevant in natural resource 
management as described by Benjaminsen and Svarstad (2010) and Boyce (2002) and the 
distribution of such power between the different stakeholders in the forest sector. How are 
power relations between various actors within the forest adjacent communities, between 
community level and district authorities, and towards external private actors such as logging 
companies? Will knowledge and information successfully be disseminated through awareness 
raising campaigns and will the process of implementing PFM strengthen the power of the 
forest adjacent villagers, and their ability to influence forest governance, to hold authorities 
accountable and to pursue legal enforcement?  
 
 
2.2 Key concepts and definitions 
 
In order to discuss the thesis‟ objective of improved forest governance, I will first elaborate 
my understanding of governance, forest governance and the key factors of these concepts; 
transparency, accountability, participation and enforcement. 
 
 
2.2.1 Governance 
 
Good governance is regarded as one of the key aspects of poverty reduction and sustainable 
development. Its‟ definition has changed over time, it is subjective, and has been dominated 
by Western standards and values (Punyaratabandhu 2004). In general, good governance is 
regarded as a result of a combination of participation, accountability, transparency, the rule of 
law and predictability. Sometimes it also includes democratic practices, civil liberties and 
access to information (Punyaratabandhu 2004:2). The doctrine of the separation of state 
powers into legislative, executive and judicial functions enables checks and balances, and 
limits the possibilities for abuse of power by the state. Equally important is the protection of 
human rights, encompassing principles such as freedom of expression and equal right to 
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protection from discrimination and the right to equal access to public services (Palamagamba 
n.d.),(UN n.d.). 
 
 
The Poverty Task Force of the Asian Development Bank has constructed a table for good 
governance indicators in Vietnam (see Table 1). I have slightly modified this table to make it 
relevant also for developing countries in other continents. 
 
Table 1: Good governance indicators 
 
Outcome Transparency Accountability Participation Predictability 
A stronger, more 
efficient public service 
which is capable of 
implementing policy 
and delivering better 
services to people at all 
levels 
 
 
 
 
 
Better and more 
transparent public 
financial management 
 
 
 
 
 
Wider access to justice 
and equal opportunities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
More participative and 
responsive government, 
particularly at local 
levels 
 
 
 
A government which 
prevents, and fights, 
corruption at all levels 
Extent to which 
information is publicly 
available regarding 
services, policies and 
planning arrangements 
at all levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Level of budget 
transparency regarding 
central, provincial and 
local taxation, 
budgeting, and 
spending patterns for 
each sector 
 
Extent to which 
decisions and verdicts 
of courts and tribunals 
are publicly available 
 
Extent to which the 
means of redress are 
made available 
 
Extent of formal 
recognition of the role 
of civil society in 
government at all 
levels 
 
 
Extent to which 
information on 
corruption is made 
public 
Degree of redress that 
the poor can obtain 
when faced with poor 
access to and/or low 
quality services from 
the Public Service 
 
Whether civil servants 
are being paid and 
promoted in accordance 
with merit 
 
The extent to which 
expenditure that is 
incurred at all levels of 
government is open to 
independent scrutiny 
and reporting 
 
 
Ability of the poor to 
access the court and 
tribunal system to seek 
redress, including 
against Government 
agencies 
 
 
 
Extent to which local 
government is 
responsive to and 
follows up problems 
that are raised with 
them by the poor 
 
Extent to which there 
are institutional 
mechanisms for 
pursuing corruption  
The extent to which the poor 
has an opportunity to 
participate in the policy-
making and implementation 
process at the local level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whether the poor has the 
opportunity to participate in 
budget formulation at each 
level of government 
 
 
 
 
Extent to which there is a 
process for consultation with 
civil society in the process of 
preparation of laws, decrees 
and regulations 
 
 
 
Extent to which local 
democracy has been 
implemented in each 
commune so as to improve 
the opportunities for public 
participation, downward 
accountability and 
community monitoring. 
 
Extent to which there are 
institutional mechanisms 
available to civil society to 
raise issues of corruption 
Extent of access of the 
poor to basic government 
services such as health, 
education, infrastructure, 
water and power at the 
local level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent to which, at the 
national level of 
expenditure that is 
targeted to pro-poor 
purposes is predictable 
from year to year 
 
 
Extent to which the law is 
applied by all institutions 
fairly and predictably in 
all fields of activities, 
including in the 
resolution of 
administrative disputes 
 
 
 
Extent to which services 
provided at the local level 
to the poor are delivered 
in accordance with client 
charters 
 
 
Extent to which laws for 
combating corruption are 
effective 
 
Source: Based on Punyaratabandhu (2004).  
 
 
The table focuses on openness and dialogue between those holding power and the civil 
society. As illustrated, the words „transparency‟, „accountability‟, „participation‟ and 
„predictability‟ are central for the trust in good governance. Applying these concepts to public 
services, financial management and the rule of law, equality and fair treatment of all citizens 
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is the aim. Important tools in this process will be the respect for human rights, freedom of 
expression and a free press/media, and a well functioning democracy with multiple political 
parties as well as independent civil society organisations. 
 
 
Of special interest with regard to this thesis is the relation between governance and 
corruption. Robbins (2000:428) describes corruption within natural resource management as 
follows: “corruption is the bending of explicitly equitable state institutions around structures 
of regional and local social capital to create unequal distributive outcomes”. I will look further 
into corruption in relation to the concept of forest governance. 
 
2.2.2 Forest governance 
 
Forest governance involves balancing conflicting ideas, i.e. the commercial versus the 
conservational values. Whereas extraction of valuable resources may create much needed 
financial support, there are also strong forces behind the need of conservation for 
environmental reasons. 
 
Historically in Africa, forest conservation was enforced by state control or private property 
rights. Through the establishment of national parks and protected areas local communities 
were denied access and excluded from their traditional use of the forest. This policy was 
known as „fortress conservation‟, and was the common approach until the 1980‟s, often 
supported by international conservation agencies (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Over the last 
two decades there has been a change of focus. Forest governance is increasingly seen as a 
domain of local communities, through approaches as Participatory Forest Management 
(PFM). The main objectives are to obtain a more effective control and strengthen 
conservation of forest reserves as well as to secure economic benefits and poverty alleviation 
for the local communities by sustainable resource extraction (Lund et al. 2009).  
 
Corruption within the management of natural resource management is a major challenge and 
an important reason for unsustainable use. Corruption encourages overuse and complicates 
control. It creates a black market where the seller is not the legal owner and the prices are 
commonly undervalued. No benefits are accrued for preservation of the natural resource or 
returned to the public/real owner (Robbins 2000). In a neo-classical economic perspective a 
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solution to this would be to increase the individual property rights and in this way ensure that 
a „correct‟ price is set and over-exploitation discouraged. Marxists do not support this view, 
and see the privatisation and capitalization of communal property as the main problem 
making long term conservation to the best of the common difficult (Robbins 2000). Another 
reason why corruption makes forest management unsustainable is inordinate elites who often 
exclude knowledgeable resource users and thus disrupt the flow of information related to the 
conditions of the natural resource and the decision makers (Robbins 2000:432). 
 
According to Robbins (2000), it is not the lack of state control that allows corruption to 
evolve. On the contrary, by establishing institutional command over the forests, the state is 
generating circumstances for corruption to occur. Where the control over forest resources is 
given to a limited number of officers, the case of preferential licensing and bribe demands are 
more likely to happen. However, within the social and cultural context of these institutions, 
they may not appear to be corrupt, but rather accepted as legitimate establishments of resource 
management (de Sardan in Robbins 2000). 
 
The transformation from open access forests to controlled use of the forests has thus created a 
market for corrupt practices. The diverging interests of forest use will put an extra challenge 
on the institutions to act in accordance with good governance. The principles of transparency, 
accountability, participation of adjacent communities and a reliable and effective law 
enforcement system should be major objectives, in order to minimize illegal logging and 
corruption and to secure poverty alleviation. In this thesis I will look closer at these principles 
of forest governance. 
 
2.2.3 Transparency 
 
Transparency is one of the key factors of good governance and is about public access to 
information.  It is often associated with a reduced level of corruption.  Both donors and 
investors will look at the level of transparency as part of their risk assessment procedures. 
. 
The Transparency Task Force at Brookings University defines transparency as the “openness 
of institutions; that is, the degree to which outsiders (such as citizens or stockholders) can 
monitor and evaluate the actions of insiders (such as government officials or corporate 
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managers)” (Bellver and Kaufmann 2005:5). Kaufmann (2002) defines transparency as 
“increased flow of timely and reliable economic, social and political information, which is 
accessible to all relevant stakeholders”.. A more extensive definition is given by Transparency 
International on their web-site; “Transparency can be defined as a principle that allows those 
affected by administrative decisions, business transactions or charitable work to know not 
only the basic facts and figures, but also the mechanisms and processes. It is the duty of civil 
servants, managers and trustees to act visibly, predictably and understandably”. 
“Understandably” implies that information shall be presented in an appropriate way so that all 
stakeholders are able to process the information. The stakeholders‟ level of education is an 
important factor influencing this ability (Kolstad and Wiig 2008). Their availability of time 
and physical access to the information will be other factors.   
 
For the purpose of this thesis, transparency will be defined as the extent to which villagers and 
other stakeholders get access to reliable and relevant information with regard to local forest 
management, and to what extent this information is appropriate for holding those in charge of 
forest management accountable for their actions. 
 
2.2.4 Accountability  
 
Jenkins and Goetz (1999) refer to the following components of accountability:  
- “Officials must explain – i.e. account for - their actions”, which in this sense make 
accountability almost synonymous with transparency. 
- “Officials must take responsibility for their actions”, either judged on procedural 
ground or in terms of impact. 
- “Officials made accountable by voters through elections” 
 
In Policy Forum (2009:6) on the Tanzania Governance Review 2006-2007 accountability, 
based on Lawson and Rakner (2005), is defined as a chain of 3 processes. First transparency 
shall ensure enough openness and access to information so that interested parties can make 
informed judgements. Answerability means that decision makers are obliged to show that 
their decisions are reasonable, rational and within their mandate. Finally, controllability shall 
ensure that deviation from the first two principles may be sanctioned. 
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One may further ask the question; to whom are you accountable? In democratic states 
decision makers must adhere to publicly agreed policies, values, and objectives. Authorities 
will not only be horizontally accountable to their own reporting system, public audits and 
legislation, they will also be vertically accountable to citizens through elections and attention 
given by media and civic engagement. “One of the paradoxes of accountability relationships 
is that they put less powerful actors – individual citizens – in a position of demanding answers 
from more powerful actors”(Goetz 2008:3). 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, the term accountability will be used for answerability towards 
citizens, i.e. the local population adjacent to forest reserves. 
 
 
2.2.5 Participation    
 
Participation is embraced by many actors within development and natural resource 
management. Its‟ definition vary, but usually includes involvement of stakeholders in decision 
making regarding priority setting, policy making, resource allocations and access to public 
goods and services (Rahman 2005:2). The term is widely used and often misused.  Mikkelsen 
(2005), building on Chambers (2002b:1995), has classified three main ways in which the 
word participation is employed. First, it is used as cosmetic label. To suit the requirements of 
donors and governments, the word is symbolically included in planning and reports, whereas 
in reality the projects are run with a traditional top-down approach. Second, it describes co-
opting practice. Locals are encouraged to contribute with their time and labour in order to 
reduce costs. “Often this means that „they‟ (local people) participate in „our‟ project”. Third, it 
is used to describe an empowering process. Local people own the projects, do their own 
analysis, take command, and make their own decisions. “In theory this means that „we‟ 
participate in „their‟ project” (Mikkelsen 2005:54).  
 
The variation of the use of the word participation has lead many scholars to define 
participation as a graded concept, dividing the understanding of the term into levels of 
participation. There are several models of variation in participation, but generally they start 
with a level of minimal interaction between local stakeholders and decision makers and goes 
up to full ownership of a project by the local stakeholders. An example of such a model is 
listed in Table 2: 
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Table 2:  Typology of participation 
 
Typology Characteristics of each type 
Manipulative 
participation 
Participation is simply pretence, with “people‟s” representatives on 
official boards, but who are unelected and have no power. 
Passive 
participation 
People participate by being told what has been decided or has already 
happened. It is a unilateral announcement by an administration or project 
management without listening to people‟s responses. The information 
shared belongs only to external professionals. 
Participation in 
information 
giving 
People participate by giving answers to questions posed by researchers 
and project managers using questionnaire surveys or similar approaches. 
People do not have the opportunity to influence proceedings, as the 
findings of the research or project design are neither shared nor checked 
for accuracy. 
Participation by 
consulting 
People participate by being consulted, and external agents listen to views. 
These external agents define problems and solutions, and may modify 
these in the light of people‟s responses. Such a consultative process does 
not concede any share in decision making and professionals are under no 
obligation to take on board people‟s views. 
Participation for 
material 
incentives 
People participate by providing resources, for example, labour, in return 
for food, cash, or other material incentives. Much in situ research falls into 
this category: rural people provide land, but are not involved in the 
experimentation or the process of learning. This is commonly called 
participation, yet people have no stake in prolonging activities when 
incentives end. 
Functional 
participation 
Participation seen by external agencies as a means to achieve project 
goals, especially reduced costs. People participate by forming groups to 
meet pre-determined objectives related to the project, which can involve 
the development or promotion of externally-initiated social organisation. 
Such involvement does not tend to occur at the early stages of project 
cycles or planning, rather, only after major decisions have been made. 
These institutions tend to be dependent on external structures, but may 
become independent in time. 
Interactive 
participation 
People participate in joint analysis, which leads to action plans and the 
formation of new local institutions or the strengthening of existing ones. It 
tends to involve interdisciplinary methods that seek multiple perspectives 
and make use of systematic and structured learning processes. These 
groups take control over local decisions, so that people have a stake in 
maintaining structures or practices. 
Self mobilisation 
/ active 
participation 
People participate by taking initiatives independent of external institutions 
to change systems. They develop contacts with external institutions for 
resources and technical advice, but retain control over how resources are 
used. Self-mobilisation can spread if governments or NGOs provide an 
enabling framework of support. Such self initiated mobilisation and 
collective action may or may not challenge existing distribution of wealth 
and power. 
 
Source: (Pretty 1995), (Twyman 1998 referred by Rahman 2005:3). 
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A related word to participation is the notion of local ownership. It might be understood as “to 
involve the widest possible participation of those who are supposed to be the beneficiaries” 
(Helleiner 2000). Ownership refers to „owning a problem situation‟ and „owning the resources 
to address it‟ (Mikkelsen 2005). Further, local ownership has to do with attitude. Beneficiaries 
must move away from dependency and actively engage at all levels of projects, involving 
local institutions and government. “Ownership cannot be given – it has to be taken” (Helleiner 
2000). Or as Brockington (2006:122) expresses it: “new power structures or rights which are 
fought for are likely to be stronger because their presence will have required the active 
engagement of the villagers”. And the “paradox suggests that rights may be stronger if they 
are won, not given” (ibid.)  
 
For this thesis, it is important not only to assess the degree of local participation, but also to 
see who the participants are. 
 
2.2.6 Enforcement 
 
There are formal and informal enforcement. Formal enforcement refers to the jurisdiction of 
the state. Court systems, police or agencies acting on behalf of the state ensure that laws, 
regulations and formal agreements are adhered to. Punitive measures may be imprisonment, 
fines or loss of mandate for offenders. Informal enforcement refers to social norms and social 
pressure. Punitive measures may be social disapproval, loss of reputation or retaliation.  
 
Enforcement is further embedded in the following principles; prevention, detection and 
suppression (Contreras-Hermosilla 2001) . Preventive measures are aimed to reduce the 
opportunities for illegal actions. With regard to forest governance, examples include increased 
transparency and accountability in forest related decisions, reduction of discretionary power 
of forest officials and the provision of improved checks and balances within forest 
management. The civil society may also contribute to preventive measures by promoting 
public awareness or through political pressure. Private actors such as large international 
corporations may influence market forces by reducing demand for non-certified forest 
produce.  
 
Detection of forest related illegal acts depends on baseline information and monitoring 
systems. Unannounced inspections or verification of documents by cross checking various 
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information sources may reveal irregularities. Cooperation with NGOs and environmental 
groups may provide useful information, as might the pledge for reward (monetary or other) to 
„whistle blowers‟.  
 
Suppression refers to the punitive measures as arresting or imposing financial penalties on 
forest offenders. This is a risky procedure which may provoke violence. Corruption is 
generally widespread in low income countries, both within the law enforcement agencies and 
among criminals, and entrenched criminal syndicates might be dangerous to challenge. 
Further, lack of capacity in many forest law enforcement bodies causes illegal actors to go 
free even if detected. Intensified focus on these problems by donors, NGOs and media may 
pressure the authorities to prioritize law enforcement (Contreras-Hermosilla 2001).  
 
Where formal enforcement is not obtained due to incapacity or unwillingness by the legal 
enforcement system, the community might impose social sanctions on local forest offenders. 
In small communities complaints and loss of reputation may create social pressure to comply 
with acceptable behavioural standards
3
. Reaction from family members and social relations 
may persuade forest offenders to act in accordance with the local forest law. 
 
In this thesis, enforcement reflects any measures, whether formal or informal, that is suitable 
for reducing illegal behaviour. 
 
 
2.3 Forest governance in Tanzania today. 
 
 
2.3.1 Policy and legislation 
   
In 1998, for the first time since 1963, a new National Forest Policy was approved. The new 
policy opened up for substantial decentralization of forest management (URT 1998a). 
Through the establishment of Village Land Forest Reserves (VLFR), communities were 
encouraged both to manage and own their local forests. The policy aims to improve forest 
conditions in the substantial area of forests that are not included in National Forest Reserves 
                                                 
3
 Interview with consultant 07.05.2009 
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by giving adjacent communities legal jurisdiction over the land. The rationale being that local 
participation and responsibilities would encourage these communities to engage in forest 
management (Blomley 2009):9.   
 
The right for communities to own, manage or co-manage forest was made law in 2002 
through the Forest Act (URT 2002). The Forest Policy 1998 and the formalization of 
communities‟ rights through the Forest Act 2002, clearly illustrate the commitment by the 
Tanzanian government to decentralize forest management and support the implementation of 
Participatory Forest Management (PFM). The priority of PFM implementation is further 
emphasized in the National Forest Programme 2001 – 2010, which provides the strategic 
framework and plan for the implementation of the Forest Act and Policy (Blomley 2004).   
 
 
2.3.2 Participatory Forest Management (PFM) 
 
In Tanzania there are two types of PFM, Joint Forest Management (JFM) and Community 
Based Forest Management (CBFM). The distinction between these is important. CBFM 
enables the village to own and manage their forest, and get all the revenue as well as cost in 
relation to this (Meshack and Raben 2007). Studies reveal, however, that CBFM contribute 
little to income at household level, as revenue is captured by the community authorities 
(Schreckenberg and Luttrell 2009, Blomley and Iddi 2009). The district authorities will have a 
monitoring role, and may deliver some services against an agreed percentage of revenue. JFM 
involves reserved land owned by central or local government, and management 
responsibilities, costs and benefits are shared between the village and the owner of the forest 
in accordance with their agreement. In forests valued for its‟ high bio-diversity and where 
there is a strong conservation interest, JFM have been promoted by conservational 
organisations in the hope to secure local support. Adjacent communities to these protected 
forests will, however, have limited access to extract resources, whereas their responsibilities 
and costs may be considerable (Meshack & Raben 2007).  
 
To manage the forest at local level, a Village Forest Committee (VFC) shall be democratically 
elected by the Village Assembly. The VFC shall act as a sub-committee to the Village 
Council and shall be accountable to both the Village Council and the wider Village Assembly. 
By-laws and forest management plan must be developed and approved by the Village 
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Assembly, but the enactment of these regulations lies with the District authorities. When the 
villages have managed their forest in accordance with the management plan for 3 years, they 
may request for formal “gazettment” (URT 2007). 
 
At the district level there shall be a harvesting committee making decisions on harvesting 
after applications from the villages. The villages are represented by a village chairperson and 
a village executive officer in this committee (Rufiji District Executive Director Office). The 
village representatives, however, have limited influence, as the district representatives are 
holding the key positions
4
.  The district forest officers (DFO) are working on a wide variety of 
forest issues, including support to the PFM at village level and law enforcement. They are 
often under pressure to comply both from lower district levels as well as from central 
government (Williams 2009). The DFOs are responsible to the District Council.  
 
At the national level, within the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT), the 
Forest and Beekeeping Division (FBD) is responsible for the development of forest policy, 
legislation, and sectoral leadership. As a consequence of the TRAFFIC report the FBD was 
reorganised and strengthened. Under the department of Forest Utilization, the Forest 
Surveillance Unit (FSU) was reinforced to secure revenue collection, surveillance and 
monitoring of harvesting and trading of forest produce throughout the whole country 
(Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009). 
 
Initially, as the FSU intensified their monitoring effort there was a substantial increase in the 
capture of illegal forest produce. Despite the initial success there are claims that FSU has been 
allocated reduced operational budgets since. The capture has also decreased. Possible reasons 
for this might be an increase in law compliance by traders, that illegal actors became more 
sophisticated in hiding their activities, or resource constraints experienced by the FSU. In 
addition the FSU are occasionally drawn to assist resource constrained DFOs which are 
further limiting their capacity (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009).  
 
At the time of my visit to Tanzania in November 2009 there was planned for the 
establishment of additional agencies to strengthen the forest sector in Tanzania. The 
Tanzanian Forest Service will be a self financing executive agency and is designed to simplify 
                                                 
4
 Interview with forest consultant 23.11.2009. 
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the chain of command within the forest sector, as well as holding jurisdiction over its 
generated income and budget (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009b). Further, The 
Independent Monitoring of Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (IM-FLEG) is aiming to 
formalize the relationship between official institutions in the forest sector and independent 
monitoring organisations(Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009b) 
 
 
 
2.4 Awareness campaigns in developing countries: origin and experiences 
 
In this section I will examine the experiences of some awareness raising campaigns in 
developing countries, initiated by external researches, the national government or by local 
grassroots movements. The campaigns can be seen to have a common theoretical foundation 
within political economy, political ecology and new institutionalism, and central concepts are 
transparency, accountability, empowerment and good governance. 
 
 
2.4.1 The „jan sunwais‟ method from Rajasthan, India 
 
In their paper “Accounts and accountability; theoretical implication of the Right-to-
information Movement in India” Rob Jenkins and Anne Marie Goetz examine the impacts of 
a campaign organised by a small grassroots activist group named The Mazdoor Kisan Shakti 
Sangathan (MKSS) in Rajasthan, demanding increased accountability of local authorities. 
Concerned about how the central government‟s efforts to enforce minimum wage regulations, 
and to secure subsidised prices of food and necessary commodities, were undermined by 
corrupt local government practices, MKSS developed a radical method to call for 
accountability. By publishing official documents at village meetings, MKSS believed they 
would not only discover, but also prove malpractice undertaken by the local authorities. 
Several “jan sunwais” or public hearings were organised beside the formal structure of the 
village assembly, and documents such as official expenditure reports, bills for services or 
purchase of materials and employment registers were read out loud. In this way villagers 
could discover if their name unrightfully was listed as recipients within an anti-poverty 
scheme, or if billings and expenditure were paid out for work never performed (Jenkins and 
Goetz 1999). 
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There was, however, major resistance among local government officials against this 
information campaign. The resistance was so strong that village-level development officers 
went on a state-wide strike, claiming they should only be liable to government audit, not to 
public investigation. For illiterate persons which needed assistance in order to fully 
understand and verify the content of a document, MKSS needed not only access to the 
information, but also to obtain a copy of it. A certified copy was also a requirement in order to 
prove and legally pursue malpractice. MKSS depended thus on sympathetic bureaucrats to 
obtain the required papers. There were no punitive measures for officials that failed to comply 
with giving out information, and there were both resistance and procrastination on the part of 
the administration on demanding investigation of corruption cases exposed through these 
public meetings. These obstacles limited the impact of the „jan sunwais‟ (Jenkins and Goetz 
1999). 
 
The method of „jan sunwais‟ has unsuccessfully been attempted by other activist groups 
elsewhere. Their failure may be caused by of lack of sensitisation of both the local people and 
the officials of the rationale and possible impacts of such exercises. “The negative result 
demonstrated, among other things, that a movement‟s impact is critically conditioned by the 
route through which people arrive at the decision to assert that information is theirs by right” 
(Jenkins and Goetz 1999:10). 
 
 
2.4.2 Newspaper campaign to improve schooling in Uganda. 
 
The government of Uganda initiated this bottom-up campaign after a public expenditure 
tracking survey (PETS) had discovered extensive theft of public grants intended for primary 
schools. The majority of the grants were detained by local government officials and 
politicians, whereas only 20% reached the original purpose – the schools. By publishing 
details of the grant program and dates and amounts of transfer to the districts in national 
newspapers and in their local language editions, the schools were enabled to improve the 
follow up their rights (Reinikka and Svensson 2005).  
 
An assessment of the results of this campaign is quoted by Reinikka and Svensson (2005). 
Their approach was to measure each school‟s access to information in terms of distance to 
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nearest newspaper outlet, as well as directly testing the head-teacher‟s knowledge of the grant 
program. Overall, the campaign turned out to be a huge success. While the average school in 
1995, before the campaign started, received only 24% of entitled grants, by 2001 this figure 
had risen to over 80%. There were, however, variations in these figures and it was found that 
there was a strong correlation between a school‟s distance to the nearest newspaper outlet and 
its headmaster‟s knowledge about the grant program. The schools that were best informed 
also experienced a larger decrease in local capture of funds. This further influenced both the 
enrolment to the schools and pupils‟ test results (Reinikka and Svensson 2005). 
 
Paul Hubbard (2007) examines this campaign in relation to the financial, economic and 
information reforms in Uganda during the period 1995 to 2001. Prior to the information 
campaign, there had been very little knowledge about the various grant programs for schools. 
The capitation grant, on which the campaign focused, constituted only a minor part of 
government school funding (12% if received in full). In 1997 an educational reform decided 
that schools should be free to attend for up to four children per family. To compensate the 
schools for the loss of tuition fees previously paid by the parents, the capitation grant was 
revised and doubled. The huge boost in enrolment that derived from this reform further 
increased the schools opportunity and need to draw funding from the capitation grant. This 
increase in government transfer out to the districts was accompanied by stricter routines for 
monitoring and control. This was further emphasized by donors, as funding was given subject 
to accountability conditions. Information on grants, salaries and finances was to be published 
on public notice boards, and radio programs both informed and urged parents to monitor 
school funding. It is, thus, difficult to measure the relative impact of the newspaper campaign 
compared to impact of the structural reforms in education, finance and information in Uganda 
during the same period. It should be noted that in this case the distribution of information was 
used as a preventive measure, enabling the beneficiaries to secure their rights, rather than a 
punitive measure for sanctioning misdeeds in the aftermath.  
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2.4.3 Community based monitoring project in Uganda 
 
Another project calling for participatory control is Martina Björkman‟s and Jakob Svensson‟s 
Community Based Monitoring Project in Uganda. The project, or rather a field experiment, 
was initiated by foreign researchers motivated to find a method the local community could 
use to improve the inadequate public health services to the poor. Unlike the two other 
examples of awareness raising campaigns, the malpractices were not primarily caused by 
corrupt practices, but rather a result of mismanagement and weak incentives by health 
personnel to perform satisfactorily.  Through report cards, the users of health dispensaries 
were supposed to give feedback on their perception of the service rendered, and improve the 
situation through local action. The project aimed to address two major constraints, namely 
access to reliable and structured information and community members‟ ability and willingness 
to act on this information (Björkman and Svensson 2007).  
 
The collection of reliable and structured information was important as such information 
cannot be brushed aside as anecdotal, partial or irrelevant by the service providers. Further, 
the information gathered must be made known to the local community members in a way that 
encourage action. The conclusion from extensive piloting indicated that merely reporting the 
findings would not motivate community members to act. Instead a participatory approach was 
chosen, where the community members themselves actively examined the information 
gathered. Invitations to participate were handed out to various spectra of the population, such 
as young, old, women, mothers, disabled and leaders. In this way they could avoid the 
problem of elite capture. The information was then communicated at village meetings using 
interactive methods encouraging people to participate. The objective of the meetings was not 
only to share information, but also to develop a collective strategy and action plan for 
monitoring and improving service delivery (Björkman and Svensson 2007:10).  
 
In such community based monitoring there is a potential risk of „free riders‟ as everyone 
rather wish that someone else shall do the job. There are also limits to the community 
members‟ ability to sanction as beneficiaries of rural health programs are often perceived as 
socially inferior to the health care workers. There had been little motivation for health care 
workers to improve their efforts as salary and promotion possibilities had been more 
dependent on seniority than merits and competence. Formal sanctions such as dismissals were 
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rarely practiced and then only after severe abuse of their position (Björkman and Svensson 
2007). There was, however, a possibility for community members to give some social reward 
or punishment through social and political connections. 
 
Participating community members and health care workers were brought together and through 
role-play exercises and discussions they agreed upon a shared action plan including ways for 
community monitoring. These exercises worked out well, and the results of the intervention 
concluded with an improvement in both quality and quantity of health care provision. 
 
 
2.4.4 Discussion 
 
All the three campaigns described above calls for accountability through transparency and 
access to information. Intended beneficiaries are encouraged through awareness to demand 
their lawful right to public services from local governments. Three critical issues for at least 
the „jan sunwais‟ and the citizen report card projects to succeed seem to have been: 
participation, or how local community member are motivated to take action; access to 
relevant and reliable information; and the local community members‟ ability to sanction 
malpractice. I will look further at each of these issues. 
 
With regard to participation, the „jan sunwais‟ was arranged by an organisation which driving 
force was the local residents in combination with some activists. They addressed problems 
well known to many poor community members, such as very low wages and lack of access to 
subsidised food. The poor were directly affected by these shortcomings, but had not been able 
to prove the malpractice. The exposure of fraudulent mechanisms through „jan sunwais‟ 
validated local knowledge, stimulated local dissatisfaction and encouraged local participation 
to uncover and protest against corruption (Jenkins and Goetz 1999). 
 
 The community based monitoring of public health services in Uganda, was on the other hand 
initiated and set up as a field experiment. The availability of proper public health service is an 
issue of concern of the poor. The project‟s objective was not only to produce information 
about the negligence of health centres, but rather to encourage community members to 
participate in the planning of an action plan in order to improve and monitor service delivery. 
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Their approach had many similarities to participatory rural appraisal (PRA) (Björkman and 
Svensson 2007). Community members should themselves gather, interpret and analyse the 
information. Deshingkar and James in Mikkelsen (2005) have under the heading “The 
Tyranny of Tools – Concerns about PRA from the field” described how “facipulation” help 
communities to identify pre-defined project focuses, as if it was their own discovery. Another 
concern about PRA is how existing social structures may be reinforced as the elite capture the 
new roles at the expense of the marginalised which the intervention intended to help 
(Mikkelsen 2005:80). In order to steer clear of the latter participants were invited from 
different segments of the society. To avoid influencing local initiatives the survey team of the 
experiment withdrew from the meetings after the initial stages. Data collection and analysis 
were, however, supervised by the evaluators, securing the quality of the data throughout the 
project. The field experiment was brought to large scale, involving 55000 households.  It is 
nevertheless uncertain to what extent these participatory processes and their outcome will be 
able to be maintained in the longer term (Björkman and Svensson 2007).  
 
The access to reliable information is another major challenge. The emphasis in participatory 
monitoring is usually on the generation of information from the grassroots (Jenkins and Goetz 
1999). The citizen report card project is an example of this. The large scale of information 
gathering ensured that service providers hardly could brush the information aside as 
unreliable, biased or irrelevant (Björkman and Svensson 2007). For the „jan sunwais‟ method 
access to information was a goal in itself. They had no legal entitlement to obtain official 
documents, and as the activists generally were met with resistance by the local government 
officials to hand over information, they depended on cooperation with friendly bureaucrats. 
Likewise was the public hearings organised outside the statutorily recognised village 
assemblies. The „jan sunwais‟ method thus implied confrontation with the authorities, both 
with regard to access to the documentation and later to demand officials to explain apparent 
discrepancies (Jenkins and Goetz 1999). The consequences for those engaged in revealing 
confrontational information can be serious if those in power are challenged (Mikkelsen 2005).  
This confrontational aspect has caused the NGOs engaged in participatory development rarely 
to focus on the right to information. Most NGOs aim to maintain a good relationship with the 
local government in order to secure their daily operations which often embrace partnership 
with the same authorities (Jenkins and Goetz 1999). The act of auditing official documents is 
further seen as a technical skill, normally limited to literate and educated people. To involve 
poor and illiterate people in this process has not been seen as productive. The „jan sunwais‟ 
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method exposed the potential these groups have to engage in collective action (Jenkins and 
Goetz 1999).   
 
Finally, to avoid the notion of “powerless awareness” holding the information of abuse is of 
no use if there are no sanction possibilities available. In both cases mentioned above legal 
punitive potentials were limited. Even where „jan sunwais‟ had uncovered corrupt behaviour, 
bureaucrats could through foot-dragging avoid legal action (Jenkins and Goetz 1999). In the 
case of health service dispensaries in Uganda, the process of dismissing health personnel was 
cumbersome and had to be taken through several instances up to the top district level, which 
was rarely done. And as the remuneration system of health workers were more determined by 
educational qualifications and seniority, rather than their job performance, there were no 
financial incentives for health personnel to increase their effort. The community had, 
however, a possible authority through social rewards and sanctions that affected the health 
workers‟ reputation. The quality of health services was more often discussed in local council 
meetings. Complaints or appraisals by the users may have motivated staff to improve their 
performance. Colleagues, family of friendly relations may have further promoted the social 
prestige of doing a good job (Björkman and Svensson 2007). The resistance of bureaucrats 
and local government officials in the „jan sunwais‟ case may be harder to combat with social 
measures, as colleagues and senior officials tended to protect each other against allegations 
from the socially inferior and marginalised groups. The role of media or democratically 
elections may have additional impact.    
 
The issues of participation, access to information and sanction possibilities will be thoroughly 
discussed later in the thesis. 
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2.4.5 The Mama Misitu Campaign 
 
The Mama Misitu awareness raising campaign was initiated as a response to Milledge et al‟s 
TRAFFIC report of 2007. It was a collaborative initiative, drawing on the diverse experience 
by the various partners. The objectives of the campaign were identified as (Williams 2009): 
  
1. Forest adjacent communities become aware of the economic value of forest 
resources and begin to demand and receive benefits arising from sustainable forest 
management. 
2. Key forest governance issues are recognised and addressed through increased 
stakeholder awareness and the adoption of appropriate stakeholder actions focused 
on stopping the illegal timber trade and promoting best practices in forest 
management. 
 
To obtain these goals, the following six issue groups addressing the recommendations 
proposed by the TRAFFIC report were planned for (Mama Misitu PIU 2008): 
  
1. Increasing stakeholder awareness about the economic value of forests and the need 
for improved forest governance. 
2. Challenging corruption and encouraging improvement of moral values. 
3. Improving stakeholder understanding of forest harvest compliance supported by 
increased availability of information. 
4. Increasing local awareness about law compliance and improved prosecution of 
forest crime. 
5. Emphasizing the need to strengthen PFM and improve the speed of its roll-out. 
6. Improving stakeholder awareness about the need to increase timber export 
standards. 
 
The campaign should be run at both the national and the local levels. For the local activities it 
was decided to start with a pilot phase in the districts of Rufiji and Kilwa. The pilot phase 
should run for 12 months. Thereafter, there would be an evaluation process before 
implementing the campaign on a larger scale. The main donor for the pilot phase was the 
Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Williams 2009). 
30 
 
 
Campaign activities at the national level 
On the national level it started with a grand launch of the campaign with the guest of honour 
Dr Wangari Maathai. This was the main story in the next issue of the magazine FEMA, 
reaching millions of readers, produced and distributed by Femina HIP, one of the campaign 
partners. Except from the article in FEMA, however, there have been very few articles in the 
national printed media.  
 
The branding of the campaign such as the Mama Misitu motto and logo was also developed 
and promoted at the national level. Printed materials such as leaflets and information 
brochures, as well as promotional merchandise such as T-shirts, khangas, caps and polo shirts 
with the Mama Misitu message, were produced centrally for distribution at local level 
(Williams 2009). 
 
TV-spots encouraging people to call in and report law infringement issues in the forestry 
sector were produced. The Project Implementation Unit (PIU) received some 50 calls a day as 
a direct response after each broadcast. The information was passed on to senior staff within 
FBD which would then seek to take appropriate action. However the PIU was not sufficiently 
prepared to handle such response from the general public, and arrangements for receiving the 
calls and appropriate protocols were not in place (Williams 2009). Further a forest crime 
drama was recorded and broadcasted on radio in 8 episodes. These episodes did not give any 
opportunity for feedback, and there were no other monitoring mechanism in place to evaluate 
how these shows were received (Williams 2009).  
 
The Mama Misitu Campaign has a well designed web-site. But, it has not been updated since 
the start of the campaign. No reports on progress, events or accounts have been posted. 
Further, clear statements from government leaders denouncing corruption in the forest sector 
were planned to be made public. However, this was not achieved due to lack of cooperation 
from government leaders (Williams 2009). PIU has also produced law compliance packages 
and harvesting guidelines, but these have lagged considerably behind time schedule and had 
at the time of the rapid interim evaluation in may 2009, just started to be distributed at local 
level (Williams 2009). 
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Campaign activities at the local level. 
At the local level a 12 month pilot project of the Mama Misitu Campaign was chosen to be 
conducted in the Kilwa and Rufiji districts. This area had been identified by the TRAFFIC 
report as prone to extensive illegal logging. As one of the poorest areas in Tanzania, much of 
the population is dependent on the forest for their livelihood. Adult literacy rate in the two 
districts are as low as 51 – 52% (URT 2005), which is much lower than the average for 
Tanzania. Forest coverage in this area is Miombo woodlands with some patches of coastal 
forest.  
 
  
Map 1: Rufiji and Kilwa – the pilot districts for the Mama Misitu campaign  
 
           
Source: Rapid Interim Report (Williams 2009). 
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The leading implementing partners for the Mama Misitu campaign were Mpingo 
Conservation Project (MCP) in Kilwa and WWF Matumbi Kichi Coastal Forest Project in 
Rufiji. Both these organisations had established programs and connections with district 
authorities as well as villages in which they were already operating (Williams 2009). A 
cooperating partner in both districts has been the association of community based forest 
management (MJUMITA).  
 
The Mpingo Conservation Project is based in the Kilwa district where some of the greatest 
remaining stocks of Mpingo are to be found. The area has experienced a high rate of illegal 
logging. MCP is promoting sustainable utilisation of the forest, creating awareness about the 
real value of timber, enabling villagers to demand an appropriate price from loggers. In 
addition the MCP is working alongside the DFO in Kilwa assisting the development and 
implementation of PFM in the district.  
 
The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) has long experience from Tanzania. Concerned 
about the preservation of Miombo woodlands, WWF is working with local communities, 
governments and organizations, encouraging the use of natural resources in a more 
sustainable way. Their objectives are to increase the local population participation in natural 
resource management and to secure a non-discriminatory access to forest produce, as well as 
promoting alternative livelihoods (WWF Tanzania Office‟s web-site)   
 
MJUMITA is a network of Community Based Forest Management Associations aiming to 
encourage participation of forest user groups in the management and conservation of 
neighbouring forest resources. The network covers 16 regions in Tanzania, with more than 70 
CBOs working under it. By sharing information and empowering marginalized groups, as 
rural poor and women in particular, MJUMITA is working to enhance competence of forest 
adjacent villagers to improve forest governance as well as their livelihood by gaining income 
through forest activities (MJUMITA 2008). 
 
The pilot phase of the awareness raising campaign was carried out in 11 villages in Rufiji and 
10 villages in Kilwa. Prior to the implementation a Knowledge Attitude and Practice study 
(KAP) was undertaken in 15 villages, 14 of these in the pilot districts and 1 village in 
Morogoro as a control. Four workshops were organised for local partners and district staff in 
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order to increase the understanding of the campaign‟s objectives and issues, and introductory 
meetings with village governments were carried out (Williams 2009:13). 
 
A drama group, recognisable from the TV spots, performed on road shows in the targeted 
villages. These events aimed to raise awareness on the importance of natural resources and to 
trigger public concern on illegal harvesting. Some 200 – 300 villagers would gather and raise 
attention on issues such as corrupt behaviour of forest officials, nocturnal transports of illegal 
forest products, the involvement of village leaders and government officials in illegal 
harvesting and a demand for more information on harvesting procedures (WWF 2009). An 
interactive video documentary, developed in cooperation with the FBD‟s Zonal Extension 
Unit, was also shown around in the villages, followed by a village meeting. At the events 
promotional merchandise with the Mama Misitu message was distributed (Williams 2009). In 
Rufiji district the local leading partner organized a world environment day, marking the day 
with schoolchildren presenting songs and poems and a local drama group performing (WWF 
2009). In both pilot districts a school competition was organised. These competitions attracted 
many parent and community members and did thus reach out to more than the youngest 
generation. All the participating schools were awarded with merchandise such as footballs, 
exercise books, T-shirts, caps and monetary gifts (WWF 2009). I was told that the songs were 
still sung by schoolchildren, even also by the village assembly
5
. 
 
By the roadside at the entrance of many of the targeted villages there were put up Mama 
Misitu signboards. These functioned as a daily reminder of the campaigns message – stop 
illegal harvesting of forest products – Take action! (WWF 2009).  
 
                                                 
5
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      Mama Misitu signboard by the road at Nyamwage village. 
 
 
According to Williams (2009), activities at the local level were affected by delays in delivery 
from the PIU, which again was restrained by uncertainties and delays in funding from the 
Finnish Embassy in Dar es Salaam. One of the challenges identified was that the roles and 
responsibilities between the PIU and the implementing partners were not clarified. Given the 
variety of approaches used by the implementing partners, sufficient learning time is required 
in order to run such a collaborative project smoothly (Williams 2009).  
 
There were some spill over effects to areas outside the pilot area as relatives had spread the 
Mama Misitu message forward to non-participating villages. Both the implementing partners 
and the PIU had received requests from neighbouring villages wanting to join the campaign 
(Kahyarara 2009). Similar requests had come from other areas in Tanzania, even from Ghana, 
Mozambique and Malawi
6
. 
                                                 
6
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3 The study area and research methodology  
 
This chapter first presents the study area in Tanzania. Thereafter, I discuss the methodology 
applied in my field research. I visited Tanzania during the period 10th November to 11th 
December 2009. Most of this time I spent in Dar es Salaam, interviewing academics, 
consultants and forest professionals, and also preparing the field trip to Kilwa and Rufiji 
districts. I spent one week in these districts, of which 3 days in the villages. Before and after 
my trip to Tanzania I conducted desk research, following up on some issues by e-mail and 
searched for secondary data.  
 
3.1 The study area 
 
I visited 3 of the villages targeted by the Mama Misitu Campaign in the pilot districts. These 
villages were chosen by the leading implementing partner, primarily based on accessibility as 
the rainy season had started. The villages were Ruhatwe and Mavuji villages, both situated in 
Kilwa district, and Nyamwage village in Rufiji district. I shall briefly point out some specifics 
of each village.  
 
Map: Ruhatwe and Mavuji village – Kilwa District 
 
 
Source: Google Maps. The villages are placed very inaccurately on the map. I did not succeed in finding any map with these villages marked, 
and have placed them solely by memory of driving distance and direction. 
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Ruhatwe village is situated distant from the main road. It has a population of 794 people. 
Ruhatwe has established Community Based Forest Management (CBFM), and is one of the 
villages where the Mpingo Conservation Project has been working actively. The village 
originally designated Village Land Forest Reserve (VFLR) of 1000 ha, but due to an enduring 
border dispute with Migeregere village, this area was exploited by loggers raiding most of the 
finest trees. Ruhatwe then allocated a new forested area and have now VLFR of 1706 ha. 
They have not yet managed to make an operational harvest plan (The Mpingo Conservation 
Project). I was informed that they did not experience any buyers approaching for forest 
products.  
 
There are 15 democratically elected members in the Village Forest Committee, 6 women and 
9 men. Twice a week they organize forest patrol on foot with 5 people. These patrols aim to 
prevent illegal logging
7
.  I interviewed 11 villagers in Ruhatwe. Of these were 6 men and 5 
women, age ranging from 22 to 72 years old. Their educational level was relatively higher 
than in the other case villages. One of these respondents in Ruhatwe had completed Standard 
4; seven had completed Standard 7; two had finished Form 4, and the last and oldest 
respondent had received adult vocational education. The sampling procedure will be 
explained in chapter 3.4.1. 
 
Mavuji village is situated on the main road between Dar es Salaam and Lindi, and have much 
easier access to the markets than Ruhatwe village. The village population is 1000. Much of 
the land surrounding Mavuji has been leased out to the Dutch Bio-shape company, which 
until 2009 also employed many of the villagers. Mavuji village has assigned VLFR of 1000 – 
1500 ha, but is still in the process of implementing PFM. The VFC has 14 members, who are 
responsible for forest patrol by the end of each month. I interviewed 14 villagers in the 
Mavuji village, 6 men and 8 women, age ranging from 19 to 66. I also interviewed 3 of the 
VFC members, all men. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
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Map: Nyamwage village – Rufiji District 
 
Source: Google maps. 
 
Nyamwage village is situated at the junction to Mkapa Bridge and Utete and has good access 
to markets. The village has established CBFM and their VLFR is 1500 ha. Previously there 
was extensive illegal logging around Nyamwage, where villagers made a living of selling logs 
to business people who passed by on the road. WWF has provided support to establish 
alternative income sources for the villagers such as vending and bee keeping. Saving and 
credit groups have also been established. These groups have received training on 
entrepreneurship, leadership and group management. Group members are now also leaders for 
other factions, some elected into the VFC
8
. The VFC has 18 members, 9 of each sex. I 
interviewed 6 villagers in Nyamwage, 3 men in the age 64 – 68 and 3 women between 32 and 
40 years old. 
 
3.2 Analytical foundation  
 
The nature of my research objective made me choose a qualitative approach. For a start I had 
more questions than ideas and my approach between theory and research was thus inductive. 
In an inductive stance the theory is the outcome of the observations and findings (Bryman 
2008). As usual in social and qualitative research my ontological position may be defined as 
social constructivism, meaning that perceived reality is produced through social interaction 
and is in a constant state of change (Bryman 2008). Thus follows an epistemological 
consideration of interpretivism. Interpretivism makes up a contrasting epistemology to the 
                                                 
8
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positivism which is commonly used in natural sciences, and is concerned about the 
understanding of human behaviour. 
 
In order to conceptualize the problem of corruption and forest governance, I decided to focus 
on the Mama Misitu awareness raising campaign. This implies a case study design, which 
“entails the detailed and intensive analysis of a single case” (Bryman 2008). This limits, 
however, the possibility for generalisation and external validity of my findings.    
 
Ideally, I would have chosen the grounded theory approach. Grounded theory indicate that 
analyses and data collection is going on simultaneously, enabling the researcher to develop 
interpretations to focus on for further data collection (Charmaz 2003). Due to a timeframe of 
merely 1 month for my field work as well as limited financial resources, this was, however, 
not feasible. I only managed to arrange for one trip out in the field. Both before and after this 
field trip I gathered information from CBOs, consultants and academics located in Dar es 
Salaam. This information was used to plan and prepare the field work, whereas much of the 
information collected after the fieldwork was used to verify or explain my findings in the 
field.  
 
3.3 Stakeholder identification 
 
Prior to the fieldwork at the district and village levels, I identified the stakeholders in relation 
to forest governance. Sources for this exercise were the TRAFFIC report, the proposal for the 
Mama Misitu campaign downloaded from the Mama Misitu web-site, as well as other 
relevant literature. The stakeholder analysis have been reviewed and updated as I gained more 
information during the research process.  
 
Villagers/community members:  
This is a diverse group of people whose interests, well being and capacity may vary. 
Marginalized individuals may engage in illegal forest activity such as charcoal making or 
poaching, more out of necessity than free will. They may feel „fatalistic‟ to the prospects of 
their future. Their workforce may be exploited by actors that are not acting in accordance with 
forest policy and law. Other villagers may be relatively better off, better educated or situated 
with regard to power relations and social status. Gender differences might be an issue. 
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Village leaders/Village forest committee members: 
The village leaders and VFC members are elected by the village assembly, and are probably 
not among the poorest in the community as these often will be unable to meet the costs of 
participation (time spent in meetings, forest patrolling etc). Each member‟s influence may 
vary within the committee according to social status, power relations and ability to speak up 
at meetings. Village leaders and members of the VFC are in position to demand bribes and 
participate in other corrupt activities. 
  
Forest inspectors:  
In the villages I visited forest inspection is carried out by members of the village forest 
committee. They are not paid to do this work, but fines and confiscation of illegal goods will 
benefit the committee and the village council. When discovering irregularities in the forest, 
information is supposed to be given to District Forest Officer (DFO). The „thief‟ is supposed 
to be handed over to the police. But generally “they do not manage to catch them – they run 
away”9.  Forest inspectors are in good position to demand/accept bribes, by turning „a blind 
eye‟ to illegal activities uncovered during patrol. 
 
Road check point officers: 
Road check point officers shall control that the owners of transported forest products have 
paid for and obtained a transit pass. If the payment is not in order, the owner of the products 
must leave the vehicle at the check point and pay at the closest cashier office. For the check 
point at Migeregere this means to borrow a bicycle up to the Nangurukuru roundabout and 
then take a taxi or bus to the District Council Office in Kilwa Masoko. This is a fairly long 
journey and the payment procedure must take several hours. The road check point officers do 
not receive any salary. Instead they are paid a share in percent of the revenues collected for 
the transit permits. Their payment is, however, sometimes delayed. There are also huge 
seasonal variations in the traffic pattern. I was informed that the officers working at the road 
check points often are related to village leaders. Road check point officers are in a good 
position to demand/accept bribes. 
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Traders/transporters: 
Traders of forest produce are seen by many as „the bad guys‟ (Kahyarara 2009). According to 
the TRAFFIC report, traders carrying legal goods were also prone to corruption. Considering 
the lengthy procedures if acting in accordance with regulations, traders may find it tempting 
to offer bribes in order to create short cuts. 
 
District Forest Officers (DFOs): 
DFOs experience major challenges in supporting PFM and law enforcement in the districts. 
At the same time they are severely resource-constrained. This situation may affect their 
professionalism and morale negatively (Williams 2009). There had been allegations of corrupt 
practices against the DFO in Rufiji (Kahyarara 2009). The DFO is responsible to the District 
Council, and not to the FBD (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009b). District Forest 
Officers are in good position to demand/accept bribes. 
 
The central government Forest and Beekeeping Division (FBD):  
The Forest and Beekeeping Division in the ministry shall not be involved in local level forest 
management. They have, however, had problems with corrupt officers. The FBD could 
improve communication and cooperation with other public agencies such as the police for 
more effective road check point control and the Ministry of Finance for improved flow of 
payments back to the local communities.  
  
The central government Forest Surveillance Unit (FSU):  
The Forest Surveillance Units are the FBD‟s monitors. Their main objective is to prevent 
illegal logging and improve law enforcement. The FSUs are established to cover the entire 
country in seven terrestrial zones and one marine unit. The FSU possesses more than 20 
vehicles and 2 boats for patrolling. By mid 2009 the 8 units had 71 well educated staff 
members. Resource constraints are, however, limiting their capacity. The boats are for 
instance only operational one week every month (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009b). 
FSU officers are in a good position to accept/demand bribes. 
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Civil society/NGOs: 
Anti-corruption policies are on the agenda of most donors. In order to attract funding, the 
majority of Civil Society Organisations will include anti-corruption measures in their projects. 
Loss of reputation will be severe if they themselves are caught in corruption/illegal activities. 
Usually NGO/CSOs will aim to maintain a good relationship with the government and avoid 
confrontation with the authorities. 
 
Donors/international actors: 
Donors attach great importance to the principles of accountability and transparency. Control 
of financial flows is often a condition when funding.  
 
Each of these stakeholder groups possess different amounts of power and motivation for 
engaging in forest activities. Opposing objectives and conflicting interests can probably be 
found between, and also within, the various groups. Institutions, relations and perceptions of 
potential costs and benefits will influence their behaviour with regard to the process of 
decentralizing and improving forest governance. In order to illuminate the situation from 
various sides, I aimed to obtain information from as many stakeholder groups as possible.   
 
 
3.4 Research method 
 
Before, after and to some extent during my field work I conducted desk research, searching 
for secondary data through the library, databases available on the internet, and official and 
„grey‟ government papers. This documentation supplemented the information provided by key 
informants. The use of secondary data has the benefits of being cost and time efficient as well 
as to ensure high quality on a much wider set of data than would otherwise have been 
obtained. Secondary data may, however, be both complex as well as emphasising other 
variables than the key variables ideal for own research (Bryman 2008).   
 
During my fieldwork in Tanzania, I interviewed 20 key informants consisting of consultants, 
academics and forest officials. I also attended the presentation of the Mama Misitu 
Campaign‟s evaluation report at the Finnish Embassy in Dar es Salaam. During the field trip 
to the three villages, I spent one day in each and interviewed 34 villagers, of whom three did 
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not complete the full questionnaire and therefore was deducted from the sample
10
. In addition, 
I interviewed two employees at the Migeregere road check point and three Village Forest 
Committee members. In the first village visited, I also conducted a focus group discussion 
with VFC members.  
 
Qualitative interviews is the most popular and common method in development studies. These 
interviews are often „conversational‟ at the same time as being controlled and structured. 
Some questions and topics will be predetermined, whereas many questions will emerge during 
the interview (Mikkelsen 2005). Semi-structured interviews, using an interview guide or 
checklist have the advantage of being matched to individuals and circumstances. Logical gaps 
in data can be anticipated and closed. The flexibility does, however, reduce the comparability 
of responses (Patton 2002 cited in Mikkelsen 2005). 
 
All my key informants were interviewed in a semi-structured way. Instead of having a fixed 
set of questions I used a check list. The checklist was adjusted to suit each specific 
respondent, although I tried to include the same topics in order to obtain comparable 
information. The flexibility of my questions enabled the interviewee to elaborate on preferred 
issues. I was also free to add questions and follow up as topics of special interest emerged.  
 
In the villages I used a standardized or structured open-ended interview method. All the 
respondents were asked the same questions in the same order. Most of the questions were 
unrestricted and the respondents were encouraged to elaborate, give multiple answers and if 
possible also real life examples. This interview method facilitates organisation and analysis of 
the data, as the respondents answer the same questions and thus increase the comparability of 
the answers. It does, however, also limit the flexibility to follow up on particular 
circumstances (Patton 1990 referred to in Mikkelsen 2005). On a few occasions when the 
respondents gave information of special interest and relevance, I did nonetheless add some 
extra questions to get more details on these issues. When approaching each respondent I 
introduced the questionnaire as being about forest governance. My special interest for the 
Mama Misitu campaign was not revealed until the last questions. 
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Initially in the first village I visited, I organized a focus group discussion. The participants 
were 7 members of the VFC, 4 women and 3 men, plus the village chairman. The topic for 
this discussion was how the village forest was managed. There are several practical 
challenges when conducting a focus group discussion. Ideally notes should include not only 
exactly what is said, but also how it is said and by whom. Taking precise notes and at the 
same time leading the discussion, is difficult. Bryman (2008) therefore suggests that focus 
group discussions should be recorded and subsequently transcribed. I was reluctant and did 
not bring a recorder as I feared this would restrain the participants from answering more 
sensitive questions about corruption. I experienced, however, that the group dynamics 
probably was a greater restrain to answering these questions. Even though I got answers as “if 
it is corruption in this village it is not open” and “the corruption is there but it is hidden”, the 
prevailing answer was that there “are no problems with corruption nor any nepotism in this 
village”. The focus group discussion clarified some of the issues of forest management, such 
as how decision making is done, cooperation with the district forest officer and the organising 
of forest patrols. I decided, however, not to undertake more focus group discussions as I 
considered it more fruitful to interview the participants one by one in privacy.  
 
During all my interviews, and during my visits to the field, I intentionally observed as much 
as possible. Of special interest was any form of human interaction with the forest. Simple 
observation is a non-participant situation where the observer has no influence over the 
situation observed (Bryman 2008). Small episodes, informal conversations during bus 
journeys and varied observations that I found relevant were written down in my diary.   
 
3.4.1 Sampling 
 
I applied different types of sampling methods to identify the key informants and 
representatives from the villages.  
 
Key informants 
 
Key informants were identified through purposive sampling. Purposive sampling means that 
participants are chosen in a strategic way in relation to their relevance to the research 
questions, aiming to find participants holding a variety of key characteristics (Bryman 2008). 
To achieve this I used the snowball or chain sampling method. This implies that the 
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researcher uses one relevant respondent to identify and access other relevant respondents 
(Bryman 2008). Initially, I made contact with a few central professionals who guided me 
further to other relevant key informants. Some of my preferred informants were, however, not 
present in Dar es Salaam at the time of my visit there. I also intended to visit TNRF which is 
located in Arusha, but due to time constraints this was not feasible. I did, however, interview 
representatives from a variety of institutions to illuminate the chosen topics from different 
perspectives. 
 
Villagers 
My aim was to identify a representative sample of people to interview in each village using a 
stratified random sampling method. Stratified random sampling implies that the population is 
divided into relevant categories before the samples are identified from each category entirely 
by chance (Bryman 2008). For my research these strata or categories would be related to 
gender and age. I faced, however, several constraints in applying the actual sampling 
procedure. First, the villages in which I did my interviews were picked by the leading partner 
of the Mama Misitu campaign in the area. As the rain season had started, their choice of 
villages depended on accessibility. Secondly, I did not have access to any lists of the village 
population or any maps over the villages to create a sampling frame. Thirdly, and most 
important, was my time constraint. With only one day in each village I preferred to spend as 
much time as possible doing interviews rather than the sampling process. Most important then 
was to ensure that the sampling was controlled by me and not influenced by the village 
leaders or any other local authority person. The respondents were thus identified by me as the 
translator and I walked through the village, approaching approximately every third house we 
passed, aiming to cover the whole village during the day. As it was difficult for me to 
distinguish any differences between the houses, the way villagers dressed, or other criteria 
that might unconsciously have influenced my choice, I believe the sampling was free from 
such bias. And as we kept on interviewing from 8 am to 5 pm, we also met people that would 
be out on the fields or at work parts of the day. The only factor consciously influencing my 
sampling procedure was that I attempted to interview approximately the same number of men 
and women.  
 
As we entered the first two villages, we informed that we also wanted to speak to VFC 
members. These were gathered by other villagers or came as they heard the word.  
 
45 
 
3.4.2 Quality of the data gathered 
 
In quantitative research reliability, replicability and validity of the data are important criteria 
for assessing quality. Reliability refers to the stability in the measure over time, whether there 
is consistency in the relations between indicators and to what extent observers have been 
consistent in categorizing and structuring their observations. Replicability means that the 
measures and procedures of the research shall be replicable by someone else. This requires a 
detailed explanation of all research procedures. Validity refers to the relevance of an 
indicator, to what extent the measures really reflect the explored concept which will reflect 
the integrity of the conclusions derived at from a research (Bryman 2008). Evidently, such 
measurements are not applicable in social qualitative research.  
 
Guba and Lincoln (cited in Bryman 2008) have developed alternative criteria for the 
abovementioned terminology that are more suitable for assessing qualitative data; 
trustworthiness and authenticity. Trustworthiness refers to credibility as following good 
practices in research, transferability as in avoiding quick generalisations and recognizing 
depth rather than breadth of the data, dependability as keeping complete records of all phases 
of the research process, and confirmability as striving for objectivity and acting in good faith. 
Authenticity represents a fair treatment of all responding participants, as well as to what 
extent participating in the research help members better to understand, or empower them to 
improve their situation (Bryman 2008).  
 
Assuring the quality of my findings in relation to Guba and Lincoln‟s criteria, I strived to do 
the following: Triangulation of the data (representing credibility) was primarily done against 
secondary sources such as evaluation reports, official documents and other relevant literature. 
I did also verify some information by asking experts/consultants. This has, however, not been 
possible to do to a full extent, obliging me sometimes to rely solely on the information 
received. There might therefore be some discrepancies in my data. With regard to 
transferability, all the respondents were asked the full questionnaire, given the needed time to 
reflect upon each question, and encouraged to give as comprehensive and detailed answers as 
possible. I also tried to interview representatives of as many stakeholder groups as possible, 
accessing information from different perspectives. All original notes gathered through 
observations and during interviews are kept for later reference.     
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3.4.3 Permission to undertake the research 
 
Before leaving for Tanzania I had applied for a Research Associateship with the Sokoine 
University of Agriculture in Morogoro. I also brought a confirmation of my student status 
from the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB). Considerable time of my first weeks 
in Dar es Salaam was, however, used to get all the formalities right. Before going out to the 
field I received an introductory letter from the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Forest and 
Beekeeping Division, which I presented to the District Executive Officer at my arrival in 
Kilwa. A representative from the Mpingo Conservation, the local leading partner for the 
Mama Misitu Campaign in Kilwa, also wrote me an introductory letter in Swahili, addressed 
to the village leaders in the two villages we visited, as well as the village where the road 
check-point was located.  
 
For ethical reasons and out of respect for the communities I visited, it was important for me to 
follow this official procedure. 
 
 
3.5 Ethical considerations 
 
As described above, I put great care into getting the formalities around my field research in 
accordance with local regulations. Further, I was concerned about the principles of informed 
consent, confidentiality and consequences (Bryman 2008). Before starting each interview, my 
translator presented me as a student, explaining the purpose of my research and underlining 
my independence not being associated with any organisation. Each interviewee was then 
asked if they wanted to participate.  Two women wanted to withdraw from the interviewing 
after answering approximately half my questions. Their answers have not been included in the 
sample. I did not ask their reason for withdrawal, but in one case in the Nyamwage village I 
felt it was a consequence of other people listening in. During my visit in Ruhatwe and Mavuji 
villages, my translator was very conscious of this problem both with regard to finding a 
discrete location for the interview as well as asking possible intruders to leave, pausing the 
interview until they were out of ear shot. In Nyamwage I did not manage to cooperate in the 
same way with my translator. Although we started the interviews in discrete locations, my 
presence caused attention, and people would sometimes approach during the interview. With 
regard to consequences my questionnaire did not include very sensitive questions. There 
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seemed to be openness about the corruption problem. Most villagers willingly answered all 
my questions, although one respondent clearly changed her answer when the village leader 
came within ear shot. Since I left the area once my research was finished, not having had any 
contact with these villages afterwards, I cannot say with certainty that there have been no 
consequences for the participants, but I do not believe so. 
 
When it comes to ethical considerations of interviewing my key informants, I presented 
myself and informed about the purpose of my study, at the time of making appointment for 
the interview. With regard to these respondents, I feel that my strongest ethical consideration 
is to interpret them correctly. 
 
For the ethical considerations towards the institutions I represent, UMB and through my 
associate researchship with Sokoine University, I aimed to behave correctly and respectful 
towards all participants. I believe there was never any situation occurring that could damage 
the institutions‟ reputation. 
 
 
3.6 Limitations of the study 
 
The main limitation I experienced was my short timeframe and limited resources available for 
field research. This influenced the sample sizes, sampling procedures and the possibility to 
improve the questionnaires during the research. I also had limited possibility to go back to the 
interviewees to verify or elaborate on uncertainties.  A wider sample would have reduced the 
uncertainties related to my findings. I also should have aimed to access the KAP analysis 
undertaken in the campaign‟s pilot area, as this could have given me valuable and relevant 
information to compare my finding with. 
 
Further, my personal background, subjective views and lack of local cultural understanding, 
have influenced the interpretation of information received through interviews, social 
interaction and observations. My appearance as a 46 year old white European woman may 
have misled them to believe that I rather was a representative of a NGO or other international 
institution, which again might have influenced their answers and behaviour towards me. 
My limited understanding of Kiswahili increased the possibility for misinterpretation. The 
role of the translator in the field was thus critical. During my research in the Kilwa district, I 
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communicated well with my translator, and I was very satisfied with the way he avoided to 
lead the respondents, giving them time to reflect, and ensured the privacy throughout the 
whole interview. In the Rufiji district I did not attain an equally good cooperation with the 
translator. He was appointed to me by the village leader. On several occasions I felt he was 
leading the respondent, influencing the sampling process or not taking enough care to keep 
intruders out of ear shot. Being a resident of the village and a possible friend of the village 
leader he may also have influenced or restrained some respondents. I therefore finished off the 
interviewing process in this village after only 6 interviews. Finally, I experienced the fact of 
being all by myself in an unfamiliar setting as quite challenging. There were many occasions 
where I wished for advice or a discussion partner, both with regard to practical arrangements 
as well as with academic dilemmas.  
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4 Data analysis and findings 
 
Results and findings of the study is presented and discussed in this chapter. To analyse the 
data collected from villagers in Kilwa and Rufiji districts I entered all answers given into an 
Excel spreadsheet. My questionnaire was unchanged throughout the interviews. Although 
most of the questions were open ended, I received many similar answers that could be 
categorized and clustered. By categorising the respondents, I looked for patterns of awareness, 
types of information received, accessibility, how they perceived corruption, and whether they 
trusted the VFC or not in relation to gender, age, tribe, education, and which village they lived 
in.  
 
Information received from the key informants was not comparable to the same extent as they 
had influenced the issues raised during the interviews according to their interests and 
knowledge. Using my checklist for the interviews as a starting point, I gathered their answers 
according to these topics. These interviews took place both before and after I went out in the 
field. The information received in the start was useful to prepare for the field work, whereas 
much of the information received after was used to verify or explain my findings in the field.  
 
 
4.1 Perceptions of forest value. 
 
On the question; “is forest conservation important?” all respondents felt that this was very 
much so. When asked to elaborate on why (multiple reasons encouraged), the three most 
common answers given were water catchments, environment conservation and shelter for 
wild animals. Other reasons given were conservation for future generations, provide fresh air, 
avoid disasters, that the forest is good for climate, good for soil, and it helps communities to 
live in peace. Twelve of the 31 respondents also answered that the forest provides timber or 
building materials such as grass for roofing, poles, and timber for windows, doors and 
furniture. A few also mentioned that the forest provided firewood, medicine, mushrooms or 
fruits for household use. Most of the respondents appreciating the forest for such commodities 
came from Ruhatwe, and may be a result of the village being located distant from the main 
road. The forest being an important source for economic income was not mentioned at all. 
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These answers reflect a conservational attitude. It may, however, be the result of their 
perception of me, telling me what they believed I wanted to hear. The Mama Misitu 
Campaign or other NGOs may have sensitized the villagers about the need for forest 
conservation. Or the process of establishing PFM may have put their attention to the need for 
forest preservation. Tom Blomley and Said Iddi describe in their report Participatory Forest 
Management in Tanzania 1993 – 2009 how communities will focus on conservation and 
protection rather than sustainable utilisation. They come to this conclusion by the following 
logic: CBFM has mostly been established in areas threatened by unsustainable harvesting or 
already degraded forests. The motivation for introducing community control has thus been 
more to conserve forest values than to capture economic benefits from sustainable harvesting. 
By-laws and management plans have been concerned about protection, conservation and 
restrictions of use. There is further a prevailing narrative of the need for forest conservation, 
nourished by media reports on illegal logging, climate change, declining water flows and so 
forth (Blomley and Iddi 2009:41).  
 
Through my interviews with academics, forest professionals and natural resource consultants 
I got the same impression that communities seem to give priority to conservation over 
economic utilization of the forest. But this might not only be motivated by the wish to protect 
the forest. Other reasons for not harvesting may be lack of knowledge of regeneration rate, 
lack of operational harvesting plans, or lack of agreement on benefit sharing with the district 
authorities. There might also be traditional reasons for forest conservation, such as saving for 
dry season grazing, cultural or ceremonial uses (Blomley and Ramadhani 2007; Blomley and 
Iddi 2009). 
 
Another issue focused on by the media has been the phenomena of land grabbing by large 
international companies. One example is the Dutch company Bio-shape that in 2007 acquired 
large areas in the Kilwa district for bio-fuel plantations very cheaply. This case was referred 
to by several forest professionals and natural resource consultants whom I interviewed. 
Overall there is now more awareness by communities of the value of forest, and some similar 
attempts of land acquisition by large companies have been avoided later (Kahyarara 2009). I 
attempted, during my stay in Kilwa Masoko, several times to contact the person in charge of 
the Bio-shape plantations, but I did not succeed. 
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The income potential of commercial harvesting is probably less recognized at the village 
level. I was informed about how some villagers were selling illegally harvested Mpingo logs 
very cheaply to a big commercial company. Despite being told of the real value of Mpingo, 
they could not comprehend such a huge figure. If forest adjacent communities had realized 
just how large the value of some forest produce was, they would probably also have been 
more positive to work for a sustainable extraction of these resources
11
.    
 
4.2 Information provided by Mama Misitu. 
 
Unlike many other projects which primarily aim to train village leaders, Mama Misitu address 
people at all levels
12
. Most villagers I interviewed had heard about the Mama Misitu 
campaign, although how they received the information varied. Whereas villagers in 
Nyamwage had heard about the campaign at village meetings and seminars, villagers in 
Ruhatwe mentioned the drama performance as the most common answer. None of the 
villagers in Mavuji mentioned to have seen the Mama Misitu merchandise such as khangas, 
caps and T-shirts. This probably reflects the campaign activities undertaken in each village. 
Their understanding of the campaign‟s mission was, however, more similar; that it should 
raise awareness about the importance of protecting and conserving the forest. The perception 
of forest value seemed to be environmental rather than economic; “protect the forest”, “not 
cutting trees” and “protect the forest for future generation” were common answers. Further, 
their answers included wordings as “raise awareness”, “educate” and “tell”. Only two 
villagers used the word “mobilize”. I do not know whether this is a result of translation or if 
they perceived the message to be a call for everybody to act responsibly with regard to forest 
conservation, rather than an encouragement to villagers to act on illegal activities committed 
by others. “Stop illegal harvesting – take action!” was nevertheless the message in the 
campaign‟s logo, which was printed on the village signboard as well as on leaflets, T-shirts, 
caps and khangas distributed during the campaign activities. I saw many villagers wearing 
these items, during my visit to the field. To what extent the Mama Misitu TV-spots and radio 
programs reached the attention of the villagers, and the poor in particular, is uncertain. I was 
told the TV spots had not been seen by the targeted population in Kilwa
13
. Of the villagers 
interviewed only one said she had seen the TV spot (Mavuji village) and only one had heard 
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  Interview with consultant 10.12.2009 
12
 Interview with campaign partner 17.11.2009 
13
 Interview with consultant 13.11.2009 
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any of the radio programs (Ruhatwe village)
14
. The drama performance, interactive video 
show and village meeting would have been equally accessible and understandable for all 
attending villagers. 
 
The Mama Misitu Information package does, however, aim to inform about a broader and 
more differentiated message. As described in the Rapid Interim Evaluation report, Mama 
Misitu has the potential to play a more important role raising awareness on law enforcement, 
best practices in forest management and harvesting, addressing bureaucratic delays in forest 
management processes as in CBFM and JFM, and on improving governance with regard to 
accountability of local district staff, councillors, village government and FBD officers.  
Although not widely distributed at the time of the evaluation, the PIU has produced both a law 
compliance package and harvesting guidelines to be circulated at local level (Williams 2009: 
10). Such information will enable villagers to both know and demand their rights with regard 
to both transparency of forest management decisions and accountability of those responsible 
for these. Raised awareness on these issues may also strengthen the position of the VFCs 
contra district authorities, logging companies and other possible stakeholders. It is 
recommended that through interactive communication at the local level, the campaign will be 
able to develop a clearer understanding of information needs, and adjust their efforts 
thereafter (Williams 2009.). 
 
The evaluation report by the University of Dar es Salaam points to several omissions in the 
Mama Misitu message. First, as villagers are requested to stop illegal forest activities, they 
should be provided with information on alternative livelihoods such as substitutes for their 
forest produce or alternative income activities (Kahyarara 2009:26). This criticism was joined 
by several of the consultants and forest officers I interviewed. Poverty and lack of legal 
income activities force many villagers to breach the law more out of necessity than of their 
free will. Second, the destruction of mangrove is a serious problem in the Kilwa district, but 
this was not addressed by the campaign. Neither was the situation of those villages not having 
their own forest, but still depending for their livelihood on criminal forest activity. Focus was 
on the illegal activities undertaken in the forest, whereas no attention was given to the further 
handling of the illegal products. The villages on the shore of the Indian Ocean are important 
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 It should be noted that the question did not specifically ask if they had seen or heard any of the TV spots or 
radio shows, they were rather encouraged to mentioned all the ways in which they had received any information 
about the Mama Misitu campaign. 
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outlets for logs and timber. Villagers assist illegal harvesters by providing cover or by 
assisting in loading for sea transport (Kahyarara 2009).  
 
The omissions have to be weighted up against the feasibility of making the awareness raising 
campaign too complex. Is the message created in order to mobilize for social action or to 
assist villagers in finding alternative livelihoods? It may be easier to succeed in motivating 
people if the message is kept simple. In order to maximise the synergy of running the 
campaign simultaneously on national and local level, the message should be easily 
recognisable. This leaves limitations on local adaptability of the message. In Nyamwage 
village I was told the focus had been on alternative livelihoods such as vending or 
beekeeping. This was, however, provided by the local leading partner and was not part of the 
original campaign
15
  
 
4.3 Information provided by PFM, village meetings and notice boards. 
  
I will first look at what information PFM makes available for community members, and how 
it is presented. According to the Forest Act 2002 # 7 “the Director and all officers appointed 
under this Act may, where it is appropriate to do so, provide and disseminate information and 
guidance, in writing by order or notice to members of the public in connection with the 
implementation of this Act” (URT 2002) (bold added by me). Further, under part III Forest 
Management Plans #12, #13 and #14, regard shall be taken of the views of local communities 
in the vicinity of the forest, and a detailed draft shall be made available for the public at the 
office of all village councils in the vicinity of the forest reserve. The forest management plan 
draft shall then be explained at one or more village assembly meetings, and any comments 
shall be taken into account. The village land forest management plan shall seek to have broad 
and general support from local authorities, users of the forest and other stakeholders. The 
village council shall, after appropriate publicity to the matter, hold one or more village 
assembly meetings to hear and consider any comments by community members. The village 
assembly shall approve the plan (URT 2002). In CBFM communities, the forest management 
plan shall thus be available at the office of the village council. It is read out loud at the village 
assembly which also is giving its approval. For JFM which is an agreement between parties, 
the village assembly will not have the same authority. 
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Source: Community Based Forest Management Guidelines (URT 2007) 
 
The forest management plan does, however, not include enough detailed information for the 
villagers to easily hold the VFC accountable. In some communities there has in addition been 
developed a harvesting plan. On the Mpingo Conservation Project‟s web-site16 guidelines for 
such harvesting plans can be found. These include details for how to achieve accountability 
and transparency. Section 5 in the harvesting plan describes how announcement of upcoming 
harvesting should be posted on the village notice board at least 2 days before harvesting takes 
place. The announcement shall include details of who (name of company and their 
representatives) made the request, when the request was received and date of approval as well 
as the dates when the harvest is expected to take place. Further, the area where harvesting is to 
take place, the species type and quantity timber to be cut, estimated in number of logs and 
approximate number of truck loads must be included. The announcement shall also inform 
about expected income and the actual price paid for the timber (The Mpingo Conservation 
Project). This is, however, only an example of how a harvesting plan may be formulated, and 
not imposed by law. Written information through notice boards will further only be accessible 
to literate individuals. 
 
The Community Based Forest Management Guidelines (2007) include instructions for record 
keeping of income and expenditure, permits, receipts, patrolling, offences and fines, and 
minutes. Quarterly reports shall be submitted to the DFO. The District Forest officer shall 
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 http://www.mpingoconservation.org/gc_cd_rules_n_procs.html 
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further maintain records of District Harvesting Committee meeting, approval letters from 
village councils, copies of harvest licences and transit permits, business licences, tax 
identification numbers and receipts. At the road check points detailed information about 
passing vehicles shall be maintained in ledger books (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 
2009b). The guidelines are emphasizing the central role of the Village Assembly and 
accentuate the duty of the VFC to raise awareness and inform community members about 
forest governance procedures and by-laws. The CBFM guidelines are however governmental 
“notes of guidance” which are regarded as advisory rather than legal command (URT 2007).  
The evaluation report commissioned by FBD on PFM in Tanzania 2009 found that 
community members in general had low knowledge of forest management plans and by-laws 
(Blomley & Iddi 2009:42).  
 
 
The FBD evaluation report on PFM 2003 revealed that there was a link between villagers‟ 
awareness and the demand for PFM. In villages with no exposure to PFM there was poor 
awareness, and therefore little demand for PFM interventions. PFM was always initiated after 
external stimulus and support. Some communities were attracted by the possibilities of 
controlling the income from their own forest, whereas other villages demanded PFM in order 
to protect their forest from exploitation by outsiders (URT 2003). According to Wily (2004) 
the poor majority of the village may also use the implementation of PFM to hinder excessive 
extraction of forest resources by powerful actors within their own community. Awareness 
raising and education of villagers are thus essential in order to achieve levels of participation 
and commitment within communities. This is further emphasized in the objectives of the 
Forest Act 2002 part II # 3(b); “to encourage and facilitate the active participation of the 
citizen in the sustainable planning, management, use and conservation of forest resources 
through the development of individual and community rights, whether derived from 
customary law or under this Act, to use and manage forest resources”, and # 3 (h); “to 
facilitate greater public awareness of the cultural, economic and social benefits for conserving 
and increasing sustainable forest cover by developing programmes in training, research and 
public education” (URT 2002). 
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4.4 What is the local perception of corruption 
 
Asking about corruption was not as sensitive as I had feared. With the exception of District 
Forest Officer, road check-point staff, village leaders, most of the VFC members and a few 
villagers, everyone I spoke to openly admitted that corruption was a serious problem within 
the forest sector. Most of the people interviewed believed also that nepotism and favourism 
were negative aspects.  Many examples were given, for the most part involving (business) 
people from outside the village bribing the village leader or forest patrollers in order to 
harvest. Fellow villagers were also accused of illegal forest activities; “they say they will 
conserve, but then they go and harvest themselves without telling the others”17. Only a few 
examples involved nepotism.  Nepotism is widespread and by many rural Tanzanians seen as 
„natural‟ (Milledge et al 2007). With regard to accountability this is not necessarily a 
disadvantage as there may be more reluctance toward cheating or lying to a senior family 
relation
18
.  
 
One villager I interviewed had earlier been working with the logging of Mpingo (East African 
Blackwood). He claimed corruption was a big problem, and still is. He gave many examples 
of how villagers were paid a fraction of the real value for timber, how logs were hidden away 
from inspection and how the owner of a company would collude with local authorities
19
. 
Similar offences were described by consultants I interviewed and were also exposed in the 
TRAFFIC report. 
 
Among the villagers, all except one respondent claimed that corruption was immoral. The 
women were more pessimistic to the prospect of curbing corruption than the men, whereas 
young people (aged up to 29) were the most optimistic. With regard to my question “Do you 
believe villagers may have an impact when it comes to curbing corruption?” two thirds of the 
villagers interviewed believed so. Only half the women answered positively, whereas almost 
all the men, 13 out of 15, believed villagers could help curbing corruption. All the younger 
interviewees and most of those over 50 years old were also positive. Of those between 30 and 
50 half of the answers were positive. And all 6 interviewees from Nyamwage believed 
villagers could have an impact. When I asked them to elaborate on possible ways villagers 
                                                 
17
 Interview with villager 25.11.2009 
18
 Interview with consultant 03.12.2009 
19
 Interview with villager 25.11.2009 
57 
 
could assist in curbing corruption, the most common answer was through law enforcement by 
reporting illegal activities to the village leader or to the police. Many villagers also believed 
education or access to information was a key factor, and some called for cooperation and 
collective action among villagers. “If we deny paying small bribes and everyone follows the 
rules, there will be no more corruption”20. To the question on whether the Mama Misitu 
campaign could change the attitude of forest officers, there was more scepticism. Less than 
half of the respondents believed this campaign would have a positive impact on corruption. 
The evaluation team from the University of Dar es Salaam found no signs of reduction in 
corruption after the Mama Misitu campaign (Kahyarara 2009).  
 
Almost all my respondents had also been thinking that corruption was obstructing 
development. Examples given were: “Those who have money can get their right – those with 
no money have no right”, “if the leader is corrupt, he will take all the benefits himself, 
without telling or sharing with the community, so the community gets no development”, 
“Even in our village there is no development because the leaders are corrupt”21. The 
respondents perceived corruption to be a local problem, ranking local government official, 
staff at the road check points, forest inspectors, village leaders and local business people to be 
the most corrupt. The focus on local conditions might be because this is what they see and are 
affected by in their daily life. In Nyamwage village my respondents were less willing to rank 
corrupt behaviour of the various actors, none of them accusing the village leader or forest 
inspectors, and only one of them saying the local government was corrupt. They rather 
blamed business people and officers issuing licence to harvest. This reluctance to accuse 
fellow villagers may be a consequence of the role of my translator. In the other two villages 
local actors were most commonly blamed. A few examples of actual corruption were given, 
involving small bribes. At the same time, all except one villager interviewed, claimed that 
paying a small fee in order to facilitate a request was a good thing. This seeming 
inconsistency may indicate that the perception of corruption is not related to the size of the 
bribe but rather to other factors influencing their feeling of what is perceived as corrupt 
behaviour. 
  
The TRAFFIC report describes some social and cultural factors that influence stakeholders‟ 
perception of corruption. Some of these are rooted in Tanzanian culture, some specifically to 
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the southern parts of the country. Historically and in accordance with customary law, rural 
communities have had open access
22
 to forest produce. Ignorance of current forest legislation 
and procedures for legal harvesting may still be widespread in rural areas. Socially, respect 
for seniority in age, rank or status is deeply embedded in the Tanzanian society, making it 
very difficult for individuals of a lower position to question a superior‟s abuse of rules or 
procedures. Both patronage and nepotism, are widely accepted, and by many looked upon as 
natural, particularly in rural areas. In addition, the distinction between small scale bribery and 
other maybe customary actions like giving a tip is often blurred (Milledge et al 2007:127-
129). 
 
 
4.5 Trust in the Village Forest Committee 
 
On my question; “Do you trust the local forest committee to manage the forest to the best 
interest of your community?” only five respondents living in Ruhatwe and Mavuji village, 
three of whom were above 60 years old, said they did not trust the local VFC. They reasoned 
this with allegations such as “they are logging illegally themselves” or “they serve more their 
own interest”23. Close to 75% of the respondents answered, however, that they did trust the 
VFC. This contrasts studies described by Heini Vihemäki (2005) in the Eastern Usambara 
Mountains in Tanzania, where it was discovered problems regarding representation of various 
social groups in the VFC, and a distrust among other villagers towards the VFC leaders who 
were accused of taking part in illegal forest activities (Vihemäki 2005). The positive response 
to trust in my study may however reflect a relative trust, that they trust the VFC more than 
they would trust the Village Council or the DFO to manage the forest. To „manage‟ is also a 
wide concept, and does not specify whether they emphasize forest conservation, to keep 
offenders from collecting forest produce or to ensure that licence procedures and forest 
income are handled in the appropriate way.  
 
To what extent the implementation of PFM will improve forest management, largely depend 
on the capacity and interest of the VFC members. According to the CBFM guidelines (2007) 
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 Throughout this thesis the term „open access‟ is not referring to its widest definition of providing unlimited 
access to absolutely everybody, but rather as how forest management has been perceived to be.  “Regardless of 
de jure property regime, all forests can be de facto open access regimes if there are no effective institutions and 
mechanisms to enforce the rules” (Banana and  Gombya-Ssembajjwe 2000:96 in Mwangi et al 2008). 
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a successful VFC should consist of villagers from various parts of the community and 
particularly of those living near the forest, that are knowledgeable about forest resources, that 
are honest and can be trusted to manage money, and that are literate and active and ready to 
work for the community (URT 2007). VFCs are however prone to both external pressure and 
internal mismanagement. Elite capture and hijacking of the PFM agenda may be the result if 
influential individuals are taking control by abusing their social structural power and 
privileged access to strategic information. Community awareness and transparency will be 
important mechanisms in order to hold the VFCs accountable (URT 2003). Lund (2007) 
investigated VFC accounts in 14 villages in the Iringa district which had established CBFM. 
The majority of these VFCs had encountered problems with embezzlement soon after 
establishment. But the majority of these cases ended in dismissal of the dishonest VFC 
member (Lund 2007). The report of the Mama Misitu implementing partner WWF in Rufiji 
refers from events how villagers would blame village leaders and VFC members of being 
involved in corruption. In one village the whole village leadership was sacked after one of the 
Mama Misitu events (Kahyarara 2009). This indicates that local accountability may work in 
some cases. 
 
In accordance with the Forest Act 2002 part V #33 (1b) the VFCs shall be gender balanced. I 
was informed that this also was reflected in practice. In the villages I visited in Kilwa and 
Rufiji districts, both sexes were well represented in the VFCs. In the Nyamwage village the 
VFC consisted of 9 members of each sex, the women doing especially good, quickly 
responding to meetings, fully participating in forest patrols, transect walks and so forth. In the 
focus group discussion I had with VFC members, 4 women and 3 men where present. The 
women were, however, less participative. Two of them did not say anything at all during the 
discussion. I do not have information on whether this reflects their normal behaviour, and if 
so, how it influences the power relations and decision making process within the committee. 
 
On the question “To whom should the forest sector be accountable?”, 19 of the 31 
respondents said the forest sector should be accountable to the local community or the 
villagers. In Nyamwage all except one of the respondents answered the local government. No 
more than five respondents said the forest sector should be accountable to the VFC, and only 
one respondent, in Nyamwage, pointed to the DFO
24
.  This indicates that the villagers have a 
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strong sense of local ownership over the forest, which is a pre-condition both for encouraging 
participation and the wish for holding the VFC accountable.  The fact that the DFO, road 
check point officer and VFC members denied any knowledge about corruption indicates 
however a reluctance on their part towards being held accountable downwards by the 
community. 
 
According to sections 8 and 41 of the Forest Act (2002) District authorities have the right to 
revoke the VFC‟s mandate over the VLFR if the villages fail to follow their forest 
management plans within a given time period (URT 2007). Local decision powers are thus 
restricted within pre-determined directions established through management planning 
requirements (Ribot et al. 2006:1879). This limits the VFC‟s authority and calls for upwards 
accountability towards the District government. It will however also act as insurance for the 
local community that VFCs will adhere to the forest management plan approved by the 
Village Assembly. 
 
4.6 Communication and relationship between stakeholders 
 
Consultants and forest officials interviewed were asked about the communication and 
relationship between stakeholders with regard to the progress of the Mama Misitu Campaign. 
The question generated very different answers. Whereas most Tanzanians seemed satisfied 
with communication between the various stakeholders, some of the expatriate consultants 
were rather harsh in their critique. Some of these observations were related to the campaign, 
whereas some were more general. Misconceptions and rumours were mentioned as typical 
problems between donors and Tanzanians
25
. 
 
The chain of command within the forest sector in Tanzania may seem unclear. The DFO is 
responsible to the District Council and the District Executive Director and has no direct lines 
upwards to the FBD. This may influence resource allocation and the priorities of the DFO in a 
way that is not favouring forest issues. Road check points are under various jurisdictions, 
some are set up by the District Council/DFO, some by the FBD and some are responsible to 
the Tanzania Revenue Authority  (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009b). Traders in 
forest produce disapprove of the numerous check points they have to pass, with diverting 
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levels of understanding by check point officers on forest issues (Kahyarara 2009). In Tanzania 
there is no tradition for inter-sectoral cooperation and communications between the Ministries 
are very limited. The formal channel of communication between foresters employed by 
different authorities may involve many intercedes (URT 2003). A good flow of information 
between various stakeholders depend thus more on personal contacts and goodwill. In many 
locations the relationship between forest officers and the police are ominous, and there is also 
very limited cooperation between armed forces and foresters (Tanzania Natural Resource 
Forum 2009b).  
 
Several of the consultants I interviewed argued for improving the communication to and 
involvement of actors from the private sector. Suppliers of technical goods and services to 
support PFM, traders and timber industry actors, all rely on a sustainable forest 
management
26
.  These actors may also have experience from other areas that may serve as 
valuable input of information
27
.  
 
Traditionally the government has been responsible for forest management in Tanzania. Many 
foresters have behaved in a para-military way, making villagers fearful of encountering them 
in the forest. Foresters have also assisted in law enforcement and tax collection (URT 2003). 
Brockington (2006) describes how extraction of taxes by district councils and local 
governments were associated with institutional violence. This is a typical example of coercive 
power as described by Benjaminsen and Svarstad (2010). During the Mama Misitu village 
meetings allegations of corruption and involvement in illegal forest activities were put 
forward against district foresters, village leaders as well as VFC members (WWF 2009). Lack 
of transparency on expenditure at local level and good evidence of criminal activity by district 
officials have led villagers‟ to perceive public institutions and officials as failed and corrupt 
(Brockington 2006). Such perceptions are difficult to change, and the lack of trust complicates 
cooperation. If PFM shall succeed, district officials and foresters must adapt new styles of 
leadership and relations with communities (URT 2003). 
 
The implementation of PFM transfers the right to forest revenue from the district to the 
village level. For many district councils this implies a dramatic drop in income. The Rufiji 
district, for example, used to get approximately 60% of its locally generated income from 
                                                 
26
 Interview with consultants 30.11.2009 and 08.12.2009 
27
 Interview with consultant 08.12.2009 
62 
 
forest resources. This conflicting economic interest may be the main reason why District 
Councils often are found to delay the approval of PFM processes by passive resistance such as 
foot dragging or obstruction (URT 2003).  In the meanwhile, many villages experience that 
their forests are depleted for valuable timber (Williams 2009). 
 
 
 
Source: Community Based Forest Management Guidelines (URT 2007) 
 
 
In a study by Vyamana et al (2008) district staff was found to use changes in harvesting 
policies at national level to impose fictive costs and red tape on community governments, but 
whether this was done in ignorance or malevolence was unclear (Blomley & Iddi 2009).  
 
With the implementation of PFM more villagers get involved in consultations, discussions 
and negotiations. This may influence the relationship between forest stakeholders, as they will 
start to know, understand and maybe even trust each other, and thus ease the flow 
communication (Chambers 1997 in Buchy and Hoverman 2000:18).  
 
With regard to the Mama Misitu campaign, the PIU managed to obtain a very good, but not 
formalized, relationship and communication with the higher ranking officers within FBD, 
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FSU and senior leaders in each pilot district (Williams 2009). This was confirmed by the 
interviews I had with forest officials and campaign partners. But the campaign received some 
criticism for its‟ communication at local level. The distribution of merchandise was seen as an 
expensive and unsustainable way of raising awareness
28
, and questions emerged whether this 
distribution had appeared more like a show
29
. As some villagers had missed out on the event, 
and others had not obtained their favoured merchandise, there was some resentment around 
this allotment
30
. The merchandise was nevertheless very popular, and reinforced the Mama 
Misitu message at the village level. Further, the massive response by community members in 
the aftermath of the TV spots, had not been previewed by the PIU, nor prepared for. If you 
encourage action, a system of handling information received should have been in place. The 
web-site could have provided another valuable source of communication. Few villagers would 
have access to this information, but at district and national level, CBOs and NGOs could have 
found such web site useful. Further, there was some criticism of the campaign‟s failed use of 
the printed press. A few of the more passive campaign partners behind Mama Misitu, are 
themselves operating within the media industry, and could have provided valuable support to 
the PIU with regard to getting media coverage.  Different perceptions about how to best reach 
the target audience and how the media works may be the reason, more than lack of will, 
behind this absence of cooperation
31
.  
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5 Does increased awareness lead to improved forest governance? 
 
This chapter discusses the findings presented in chapter 4, focusing on the possible links 
between access to information, participation, accountability and legal enforcement in relation 
to awareness raising efforts and the implementation of PFM.  
 
5.1 PFM and forest governance 
Rural poor, and especially the women within this group, depend disproportionately upon 
forest resources both for subsistence, for incomes and for safety net. To find out whether this 
group has benefited through the implementation of PFM it is relevant to investigate whether 
PFM has changed their access to the forest and forest produce,  and whether they participate 
in the community‟s forest management and decision making.  
 
5.1.1 Access to forest resources 
 
With the implementation of PFM, forest management plans and by-laws will put new 
regulations on the use of the VFLR. Banning the collection of certain forest products or 
introducing harvesting fees that must be paid upfront are examples of regulations that will hit 
the poor particularly hard. In areas where villagers formerly have been accustomed to an 
„open access‟ policy, this may cause severe limitations to villagers‟ access to the forest 
(Schreckenberg & Luttrell 2009). All villagers I interviewed admitted that their household 
collected various products from the forest. In Ruhatwe village I was explained that the forest 
was divided in two, one VFLR and one „open access‟. Several of the interviewees in this 
village emphasized that they only collected forest produce from the „open access‟ part. „Open 
access‟ forests will however typically be degraded or located in a longer distance from the 
village, and thus impose an extra burden on the villagers who cannot afford to pay for access 
to the VFLR. In areas where JFM is introduced, villagers may already be accustomed to 
severe restrictions on access and harvesting, but as forest patrolling will become more 
effective at local level, illegal activities will become harder to get away with (Schreckenberg 
& Luttrell 2009).   
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This can be illustrated by an example from India where Mariette Correa (1995) found that the 
introduction of participatory forest management actually made daily life harder for the 
village‟s women. The male dominated VFC decided to sell off all firewood from the local 
forest plantation rather than using it for local consumption. In order to sustain their family‟s 
needs for firewood the women were thus left with no option but to disobey the VFC‟s ruling. 
Earlier, when the forest was under central government control, women collecting firewood 
would at least have the backing of the men in their family. But as the regulating power was 
delegated to the village level, these women were now regarded as law offenders liable for 
fine, and did instead risk to be beaten by their husbands (Hildyard et al 2001:66).  Of the 
forest officials and CSO representatives I interviewed in Tanzania, there seemed to be a quiet 
acceptance for the severely poor being involved in small scale illegal activities such as 
collection of firewood and charcoal production
32
. In a study from Iringa, Jens Friis Lund 
found that the „de facto‟ system of legal enforcement sometimes also would consider whether 
the offender was poor (Lund n.d:6). Despite this sympathy for the poor, this group is 
nevertheless a source of conflict as they frequently break the rules
33
. 
 
 
5.1.2  Participation 
 
Participatory forest management seeks to empower local communities. But local organisations 
are often weak and prone to elite capture. As found by Kajembe and Monela (2002) at a 
community based scheme in Tanzania, elites may exercise their social structural power to 
„hijack‟ the process when establishing new institutions and seize control over the political 
space created by decentralization (Campbell et al 2007) In addition elite actors often have 
privileged access to strategic information, economic resources or influence over political 
powers in the community (ref chapter 2.1.2). The procedure for nomination and election of 
VFC members is therefore of special interest.  
 
I was informed that the Village Government encouraged villagers to apply for nomination of 
the VFC either by announcement at the Village Assembly or adverts on the village notice 
board. There might be restrictions on the number of nominations from each hamlet, and 
women are encouraged to apply at the ratio of 50%. A democratic and open voting will then 
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take place at the next Village Assembly
34
. It is thus no formal restrictions or procedures that 
exclude the poor from participating in the VFC, but if the announcement is posted on the 
village‟s notice board, illiterate villagers will be less likely to comprehend the message. Poor 
people are also less likely to possess the desired criteria for VFC members (ref chapter 4.6), 
and if their strongest concern is to find food for the next 24 hours, they will be less likely to 
spare time for participating at meetings and forest management activities. As VLFR often are 
established on degraded land, potential benefits will primarily materialize sometime into the 
future. This reduces the incentives for poor individuals to invest time and effort in forest 
management participation.  
 
Nevertheless, a study from Ambangulu forest north-east in Tanzania suggests that the poor 
are putting as much time and effort into attending meetings and assemblies as the better off 
(Meshack et al 2006). The study does, however, not evaluate to what extent the various well-
being groups influence the decisions made.  Findings by Schreckenberg and Luttrell 
(2009:233) show that “even when the poor people do attend meetings they are less likely to 
voice their concerns”. In the latter study, the VFCs in the CBFM villages were dominated by 
the poor, whereas in the JFM they were disproportionably dominated by the rich. The very 
poor were underrepresented in all but one committee (Schreckenberg and Luttrell 2009). The 
very poor are thus less likely to benefit from PFM implementation, as they have less influence 
over the rules governing access to forest resources, and more to loose if this access is reduced 
(Lund n.d.). The community member‟s benefits from participation largely depend on their 
power to influence agenda and decisions.  
 
Agarwal (2001) has looked into gender differences in relation to participation. She found that 
although the rules may allow women to participate in community forest groups, lack of 
knowledge of rules, social norms, logistical difficulties such as timing of the meetings and 
personal aspects such as educational level, property or marital status may still limit women's 
involvement. Where women do participate, especially in the Executive Committee of the 
Community Forest User Groups, considerable improvement in the forest quality was found 
(Agarwal 2001). Other findings from a project in Iringa, Tanzania, indicates that even where 
significant effort was made to address, involve, train and support women in PFM issues, the 
women were less likely to understand PFM than men (Korongo 2003 in URT 2003).  Also in 
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the studies from Eastern Usambara Mountains in Tanzania by Vihemäki it was found that 
women and poor villagers normally were the least informed about forest management issues 
(Vihemäki 2005). 
 
Cleaver and Kaare (1998) tell the story of how project officers in a water and sanitation 
programme in Tanzania were concerned about the lesser participation of women as there was 
a notable disparity between the number of men and women speaking at village meetings. But 
for the women this was a deliberate choice of meeting strategy, as they would appoint one or 
two women known for their expressiveness to speak up for the whole group. They illustrated 
the effectiveness of this strategy by giving an example from a meeting where the surplus of a 
fund had been the subject of discussion. Whereas most men favoured buying beer and making 
a celebration, the women successfully insisted upon using the money on another water source 
(Cleaver and Kaare in Cooke and Kothari 2001:43). This example demonstrates how 
discursive power can influence decisions, even though the group in question seemed less 
participative. 
 
Another study undertaken in Kenya, Uganda, Mexico and Bolivia by Mwangi et al (2008) 
focuses on how women‟s participation in forest user groups affects forest resource enhancing 
behaviour.  Their findings showed that groups with a higher proportion of women and even 
more so if the groups were dominated by women, performed less well. A suggested 
explanation for this is the gender biased access to technology, women's labour constraints and 
a possible limitation to women's sanctioning power (Mwangi et al 2008). Similar constraints 
may be experienced when involving the poor and other marginalised groups, limiting their 
influential power even if they are participating. To what extent the marginalised groups may 
benefit from participation can, however, not be measured by changes in the forest condition, 
but rather to what extent participation in forest resource management can secure their 
interests, acquire benefits and thus contribute to poverty reduction. 
 
 
5.2 Awareness and accountability. 
 
In order to hold forest managers accountable, there is a need of awareness on several levels. 
First, villagers must be aware of, and understand, their rights both as part of the village 
assembly and as individuals. This includes knowledge of existing by-laws and management 
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plans with regard to the VLFR. Further, VFC members and forest officers must be aware of, 
and respect, their duty to keep the villagers informed, and adjust reporting formats so that the 
information provided can be readily understood. Finally, there must be community members 
that are capable and willing to act if mal practice is uncovered. This requires available 
sanctioning possibilities. (Björkman and Svensson 2007:6).  
 
In Nepal „Strengthened Actions for Governance in Utilization of Natural 
Resources‟ (SAGUN) programmes have successfully been facilitated by CARE, WWF and 
RIMS Nepal. Through public hearings and public auditing (PHPA) the executive forest 
committee members have to answer for decisions and financial management. In open 
meetings where forest user groups, DFOs, CSOs, NGOs, donors and local journalists are 
invited, minutes of Forest Committee meeting and financial accounts are read out loud, 
enabling the audience to comment and ask question regarding these. PHPAs differ from the 
„jan sunwais‟ (see section 2.4) method by being organised in cooperation with the local 
government, and the meeting is led by a facilitator aiming to keep an open dialogue, impartial 
and constructive ambiance. The executive forest committee members are prior to the meeting 
receiving advice and given time to prepare answers for various questions. PHPAs have 
become increasingly popular among forest user groups and have lead to improved 
transparency and accountability of forest committees, enhanced communication between 
committee members and forest users, as well as reorganization of some weaker forest 
committees by including more women and poor. Executive committee members and 
representatives of the elite have been sceptical to such public exposure, especially where there 
have been misuse of funds. In contrast to the „jan sunwais‟ method, district officials have been 
very supportive to the practice of PHPA, favouring the incorporation of PHPA in the 
constitutions of forest committees (Maharjan & Shrestha 2006). Likewise, Lund (2007) 
describes how VFCs in the Iringa region at quarterly village meetings through recitation of 
both forest income and expenditures enabled villagers to hold the VFC accountable. In cases 
of embezzlement, most of these ended in dismissal of the involved VFC members. This 
contrasts with Blomley and Iddi (2009:42) who found that VFC‟s in Tanzania rarely provided 
feedback, nor solicited the wider community. This latter attitude reduces the possibilities for 
community members to hold VFC members accountable. 
 
In order for villagers to uncover discrepancies, detailed documentation is needed, such as 
salary or employment papers, copy of invoices, delivery agreements and correspondence. 
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Much of such documentation is, however, regarded as confidential for reasons such as 
consideration of personal discretion or competition. Individuals, of whom private information 
is exposed to the public, might experience negative consequences of such. Firms and 
companies might find their negotiation power decreased if competitors get hold of too 
detailed information. A reasonable way of checking information could be to ask in privacy for 
individuals to confirm or invalidate information. This is, however, a much more time 
consuming and resource intensive method and you would loose out the effect of group 
mobilization obtained by revealing fraud in public. 
 
Often remote rural communities with great forest resources, also have low adult literacy rate 
(Blomley and Iddi 2009:40).  Where there is a lack of trust towards forest managers, outside 
organisations, such as CSOs, are welcomed for ensuring checks and balances
35
. Poor 
facilitation when establishing PFM processes can further result in the capturing of benefits by 
individual villagers to the detriment of others (Blomley et al. 2008). Studies reveal that 
compensation and allowances to village leaders and VFC members may outweigh funds spent 
on public goods and village development (Lund 2007; Blomley and Iddi 2009). Ironically this 
may benefit the condition of the forest as VFC members in such setting will be more devoted 
to their role and may be less open for informal payments. This will be especially so where 
external actors, such as professional charcoal producers, are a threat (Lund 2007:8-10). Where 
diminutive allowances are paid, the incentives for participation in the VFC will rely more on 
access to informal payments. 
   
Late in 2009 the first commercial harvest in the CBFM history in Tanzania was completed in 
Kikole village, Kilwa district. A notice was put up, but the message was not clear and some of 
the information was incorrect. Mpingo Conservation Project is working with the community 
members to ensure improved information procedures in the future. They are also in the 
process of establishing transparency routines similar to those in Iringa described by Lund 
(Mpingo Conservation Project). As more communities boost their income by commercial 
harvesting, new challenges on accountability will emerge. 
 
Finally, a new project or intervention must itself be accountable to the beneficiaries. Too 
many interventions have failed or ended prior to achieving its objectives, leaving the 
supposed beneficiaries in frustration and resignation with the incomplete outcome. Too many 
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curtailed development projects have left villagers with the feeling that the real beneficiaries 
were the implementers themselves (Williams 2009).  I was quite startled as one of my 
interviewees living close to a Mama Misitu signboard knew nothing about the campaign, nor 
seemed interested or curious if the campaign in some way could affect her. Given the lack of 
development and poverty alleviation achieved up to date it may have been a natural reaction 
to just another „elite capturing‟ project. Such experiences will make it harder to motivate 
villagers for participation in new projects. 
 
 
5.3 The Mama Misitu Campaign and legal enforcement 
 
According to the WWF Partner report for the Mama Misitu campaign, increased awareness on 
forest governance has lead to improved legal enforcement in the pilot areas. Encountering 
forest activity or transportation of forest produce, communities will now demand to see proper 
documentation proving its legitimacy (WWF 2009). In any of the targeted villages it is now 
impossible to harvest unnoticed (Kahyarara 2009:21). Several incidents of confiscation of 
illegal logs after events of the campaign have been reported. Near one sawmill in Rufiji, more 
than 700 logs were reported by informers and immediately after confiscated (WWF:3). 
Villagers were also encouraged at events to contact the Mama Misitu PIU with information on 
suspicious forest activity. The community members who called in would be compensated for 
the cost of the telephone call, and the PIU would pass on the information to senior FBD staff, 
who set off local action against the offenders. Numerous arrests were made this way 
(Kahyarara 2009:17). 
 
Also on national level the Mama Misitu campaign lead to legal action against forest crime. 
After each of the TV spots some 50 calls were received informing about illegal forest activity. 
This information too was conveyed through FBD for action locally (Williams 2009:11).    
 
Prior to the Mama Misitu campaign, similar information was given the zonal FSU directly. 
Earlier the FSU used to pay the informants a reward for tip-offs, but due to resource 
constraints this practice has almost ceased (FSU-IFM 2009). There were complaints about 
severe delays or lack of intervention by these units, and it was implied that district staff 
occasionally would tip off illegal actors enabling them to move on to avoid arrest (Williams 
2009). The use of Mama Misitu as intermediate apparently made FSU prioritize the villagers‟ 
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calls for assistance. However, apart from a good working relationship between the PIU and 
FBD, the Mama Misitu campaign did not contribute with any funds or assets to strengthen 
law enforcement, and was thus relying on the same resource constrained forest officers to take 
action. It is therefore likely that in the long run, or if the campaign is scaled up, that also the 
information calls through Mama Misitu will experience lack of intervention due to limited 
capacity.  If community members repeatedly experience that their calls for assistance do not 
lead to any action, they will be discouraged from reporting suspicious forest activity in the 
future.  
 
 
5.4 PFM and legal enforcement. 
 
The VFC members in the villages I visited seemed to associate forest management with forest 
patrolling. In Ruhatwe, which had implemented CBFM, these patrols were conducted twice a 
week. The VFC members participating in my focus group discussion were confident about the 
efficiency of such patrols. “There is no more illegal logging because of patrol” was mentioned 
several times during the group discussion. The Mavuji village had not yet implemented PFM, 
and they patrolled the forest only at the end of each month. With inside information of this 
practice, it should be uncomplicated for illegal loggers to avoid being caught. Members of the 
VFC in Mavuji also confirmed that they did not catch the illegal loggers, but they had on a 
number of occasions confiscated timber and charcoal out in the forest. As some of the 
examples given in chapter 5.1 indicate, PFM will make forest patrolling more effective. Local 
knowledge and frequent patrols will have a positive effect on both prevention and detection of 
illegal activities. But where VLFRs are located near urban centres, the market pressure for 
forest produce and outside actors logging illegally,  may be beyond the capability for villagers 
to control (Blomley and Iddi 2009).  
 
The households of all my respondents collected multiple products from the forest; firewood 
and charcoal being the most common. Traditionally the women are responsible for this 
collection, and are thus a group which is familiar with forest conditions. To include these 
women in patrolling may therefore be wise in order to detect irregularity. Female guards may 
also be better to persuade female offenders against breaking the rules (Agarwal 2001). This 
must however be weighted against the security risk for female guards and their authority 
when it comes to sanctioning male offenders who may resist arrest. It is important that the 
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villagers engaged in patrolling have knowledge of bylaws and harvesting procedures. With 
the implementation of PFM there will be more focus and awareness on forest related issues. 
Rumours about illegal activity may be picked up and easily controlled. Of my respondents, 
close to half were aware of ongoing logging activity, but there was no difference of such 
knowledge between the sexes
36
.  
 
Source: Community Based Forest Management Guidelines (URT 2007) 
 
The legal mandate of VFC members patrolling may include the right to arrest and fine 
offenders (Blomley and Ramadhani, 2004). If the offender pays the fine, which can be up to 5 
times the amount that should have been paid in royalties, he/she will keep the produce. 
Otherwise the produce shall be confiscated
37
. One of the villagers I interviewed said she had 
been caught by a VFC member when making charcoal and had paid TZS 2000 in order to 
keep the produce
38
. Whether this incident was in accordance with correct fining procedure or 
a bribe as the interviewee thought it to be, I don‟t know. According to the CBFM guidelines 
no villager shall pay a fine without receiving a receipt. The forest patroller shall keep a record 
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of fines and illegal forest activities. In order for the Village Assembly to influence forest 
management and hold the VFC accountable, transparency of the VFC‟s records and activities 
will be a pre-condition. The Village Assembly may then take decisions on dismissal of 
dishonest VFC members or impose changes in the mandate of the VFC (URT 2007). In 
addition to exercising power through the Village Assembly, villagers may impose social 
sanctions on dishonest VFC members and local forest offenders. Pressure from family or 
social relations and fear of loss of reputation may also have a preventive effect.  
 
In villages where CBFM is implemented the Village Assembly shall approve the Forest 
Management Plan and Bylaws regarding the management of the village forest. These 
documents will be enacted by the further authorization of the District Council. The Village 
Assembly is thus taking part in the design of law enforcement procedures, such as appropriate 
punishment of forest offenders or the practice for resolving conflicts (URT 2007). Due to lack 
of legal knowledge among villagers some bylaws are however found to be violating principle 
law, and can thus not be used in court (Blomley and Iddi 2009). Further, resistance from 
district authorities to enact by-laws have proven to be another constraint in pursuing legal 
enforcement at local level (URT 2003). In communities where low awareness and legal 
literacy bring such institutional failures, the improvement in detection will not lead to 
increased suppression of forest crime. Communities that are aware of laws and regulations 
with regard to CBFM, are, however, proven to be both ready and able to defend their rights 
(URT 2003.).  
 
 
5.5 Anti-corruption strategies eligible for the poor to engage in 
 
“Tanzania, like most African countries, is faced with corruption in its public and private 
sectors that has assumed endemic proportions. The government views this scourge as public 
enemy number one”. 
   
(The National anti-corruption strategy and action plan for Tanzania 1999:4) 
 
The National anti-corruption strategy and action plan for Tanzania came in 1999, while 
President Mkapa was in power. Fighting corruption was one of his main policy issues (Policy 
Forum 2009).  The 1999 strategy plan lists prevention, enforcement, public awareness and 
institution building, as main objectives to be addressed in the fight against corruption.  Since 
then, according to the World Bank Institute‟s Worldwide Governance Indicators and 
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Transparency International‟s Corruption Perception Index, there has been an improvement in 
corruption control.  Although Tanzania‟s anti-corruption law is perceived as strong, the 
Global Integrity Report 2006 judges Tanzania still as very weak on factors such as public 
access to information, accountability and law enforcement (Policy Forum 2009).  
 
Corruption in developing countries is a systemic problem, and in order to achieve 
improvement, focus should be on developing the systems rather than chasing individuals 
(Langseth et al 1997 in Leeuw et al 1999). In its‟ anti-corruption approach the World Bank‟s 
Economic Development Institute (EDI) aims to assist  the development of institution building, 
the prevention of corrupt practices , the prosecution of corrupt officials and awareness raising 
within the civil society in cooperation with governments and civil society (Leeuw et al. 1999). 
The role of the civil society is crucial, and transparency, accountability and legal enforcement 
are generally seen as key factors in anti-corruption policies. 
 
In his paper “Engaging the poor to challenge corrupt governance” (2008) Benjamin Lough 
has divided possible anti-corruption strategies into 4 categories, namely Universal legal 
reform, Public-sector reform, Democratic participation and Social action. The first two 
approaches are top-down interventions, while the two latter require grass-root mobilization 
and are thus the pertinent methods for poor people to get involved in (Lough 2008:533).  
 
Democratic participation is a soft strategy for community change (Lough 2008). As VFC 
members are elected by village assembly, they can be held accountable by their electorates. 
For democracy to work it is a precondition that the voters get access to reliable information.  
Moreover, when voting, the issue of highest importance will probably be decisive for the 
electorate. For other issues, accountability through elections/democracy will be less likely to 
work
39
.  
 
Social action calls for class consciousness and shared identity. Mass mobilization to boycott, 
rally, picket, strike or otherwise express their demands are examples of such social action. It 
is, however, a confrontational method that often results in violence (Lough 2008:536). Most 
CBOs and NGOs will be reluctant to promote such actions, as these organisations are 
depending on a good relationship with the authorities. Encouraging actions perceived to be 
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rebellious will distort collaboration with local authorities, and may be punished by denial of 
further engagement in the area (Jenkins and Goetz 1999). Further, CSOs and NGOs may 
themselves struggle with their trustworthiness. According to a research on poverty alleviation 
(REPOA 2007) adult Tanzanians rank the trustworthiness of NGO officials below the ones of 
both the police and businesspeople (Policy Forum 2009). Many state officials reject the 
NGOs‟ legitimacy as an independent voice, arguing that NGOs are self-appointed and often 
working for a foreign agenda (Policy Forum 2009). Given the numerous briefcase 
organisations and variability of professionalism among NGOs, their skepticism may 
sometimes be well founded. 
 
The poor is a group that may be difficult to engage, as most will prioritise the daily struggle 
for food. The right to information is conceived as of little importance to them, as they lack the 
time, literacy and sanctioning abilities to act upon it (Jenkins and Goetz 1999:7). They are, 
however, more likely to engage against corruption or mal governance, if they are personally 
affected, rather than if the mal function is distressing the community at large.  I.e. the poor 
will be more disturbed by embezzlement of private goods such as subsidized food, than if 
public goods such as infrastructure are affected (Kolstad and Wiig 2008:525). According to 
this theory and with regard to forest governance, villagers will only engage in anti-corruption 
efforts if they see their  access to forest produce threatened or if their personal income from 
such, actual or potential in the short term, diminished. Many poor see, however, corruption as 
an inescapable hassle and feel rather fatalistic about their possibility to improve their own 
situation (Lough 2008:539).  
 
During my interviews with the villagers I did not ask about their income, food security or 
other questions eligible for poverty ranking, but among the 31 villagers I interviewed only 6 
seemed to feel absolute negative about their own possible role in curbing corruption. Two of 
these added “because I don‟t know anything about this”, whereas two meant they would need 
help from out side
40
.  More than two thirds of the respondents believed they could have an 
impact, most of them also having an idea of how that could be, namely by reporting incidents 
of corruption to authorities for legal action, through access to information and education, and 
through villagers‟ cooperation to stop paying bribes and collectively following the rules. In 
practice there may, however, be difficult to report such incidents, as these authorities 
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themselves are perceived as corrupt by many villagers. For this policy to work there should be 
an independent institution external to the village to which villagers could report their worries. 
Local CSOs may act as such independent actors, but capacity constraints and lack of 
credibility by general population may be a problem also for these (Policy Forum 2009).   
 
 
Source: Tanzania Governance review 2006-2007 (Policy Forum 2009) 
 
Villagers may be involved in corruption either as the injured party of extortive demands from 
public officials claiming payment for services they are entitled to, or as collusive participant 
in order to gain a personal advantage. Whereas the first type of corruption may be influenced 
through awareness raising and effective channels of information, the latter will be harder to 
address as it is mutual beneficial for both parties (Kolstad and Wiig 2008). Fellow villagers 
may, however, take action if such favouritism is threatening their own situation. 
 
For villagers to engage in informed action, awareness and access to reliable information will 
be a precondition. Awareness raising programmes must thus respond to potential incentives in 
anyone area (URT 2003). 
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5.6 Local ownership 
 
Most Tanzanians I spoke to both at district level, within FBD and with the campaign partners 
said there was local ownership behind the Mama Misitu campaign and that the initiative came 
from the bottom. The leading partners in the pilot district had been working against illegal 
logging for many years, and they already had the connections and relations both at district 
level and with the various villages. They thus owned both the problem situation and the 
resources to address it. Institutions at national as well as local level were actively supporting 
this effort. The Mama Misitu campaign just came as a supplementary activity to their ongoing 
work.  
 
Some of the expatriate consultants I spoke to said that there had not been enough participation 
and that the campaign activity plans all came from the PIU centrally. Too little training, too 
little resources and too short time frame had made it difficult to implement the campaign in a 
participatory way. With regard to concepts there was a significant gap between those who 
designed the campaign and those who implemented it. PIU had been under pressure to act and 
events were driven from Dar central, without giving the local partners enough time to adjust 
events locally. 
 
These opposing views make it necessary to look further into the design and implementation of 
the campaign. 
 
5.6.1 Design of the campaign 
 
The campaign was a collaborative initiative and designed to be participatory, replicable and 
scalable. It was developed by TFWG, a versatile group of professionals, in cooperation with 
other CSOs (Williams 2009). This indicates that participation primarily is at national or 
central level, benefiting from the various knowledge of academics, consultants and centrally 
located experts. The local partners, staff at district level or the beneficiaries of the campaign, 
were not included in the planning phase, despite the intention of locally customizing and 
targeting the programme based on baseline overviews of the state of forest management and 
governance in each district (Mama Misitu PIU 2008). In fact, the budgets were developed 
before the pilot areas and the resource needs of implementing partners even were identified 
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(Williams 2009). As stated in the University of Dar Es Salaam, Department of Economics‟ 
evaluation report, the campaign‟s communication strategy lacked participatory approach. “It 
was ready made program that was almost imposed in the districts” (Kahyarara 2009:22). 
 
There is a contradiction between the design objectives of participation, replication and 
scalability - the two latter seeming difficult to combine with general participation and 
adaptability to local conditions. The inadequate identification of local stakeholders and 
relevant conditions in the pilot district may have lead to project omissions. The lack of 
information on alternative livelihoods, destruction of mangrove and villagers assistance for 
transport of illegal forest produce seaways, were examples of omissions described in section 
4.2.  
 
It was also recorded that the branding of the campaign – the Mama Misitu identity – was not 
so well received at the local level. There was a perception that the campaign was more 
addressing the women, despite the fact that there are most men involved in illegal forest 
activities. Many men found it inconvenient to wear the promotional materials as T-shirts and 
caps due to the womanly Mama Misitu logo (Kahyarara 2009). For future campaign activities 
it could therefore be considered to give some of the merchandise a more masculine, but still 
recognisable, version of the logo and message. The Mama Misitu identity was, however, 
deliberately chosen by the campaign designers, both as a relation to powerful women such as 
the Nobel Peace Price winner Dr. Wangari Maathai, as well as calling for more participation 
from the women (Williams 2009).  
 
5.6.2 Implementation of the campaign 
 
The combination of national and local approach, and the lack of participation in the outline of 
the campaign, continued to dominate the procedures for the implementation. Both the TV 
spots and the radio programmes were broadcasted on national level, not adjusted to any local 
conditions in the pilot area. The drama group road-show was also directed centrally, although 
I was told there had been some local adaptation of the performance. At village level it was 
claimed dissatisfaction with the use of an external drama group. It was perceived as a lack of 
acknowledgment of the community‟s resources when it came to performers and traditional 
dancing groups (Kahyarara 2009:24). This may indicate that villagers either hadn‟t seen the 
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TV spots or did not appreciate the recognition of the drama performers. The use of national 
media as TV is very expensive, and in order to benefit locally great care must be taken to 
timing and coordination of activities.  
 
If the campaign is scaled up, this will be very challenging, especially with regard to the great 
variety of local CSOs as implementing partners. The demand on law enforcement units will 
also be unpredictable as responses to the TV spots will come from all over the country and 
thus be difficult to prepare for. It was also recorded some discontent related to the distribution 
of the campaign merchandise, primarily from villagers that did not receive any. Although 
expensive to produce, if it is handed out in a fair and equitable way, e.g. to participants in 
competitions or villagers attending seminars, it will be an efficient reminder of the campaigns 
message lasting long after the events. 
 
Delays and uncertainties in funding were considerable challenges throughout the whole pilot 
phase. This was perceived as frustrating by the implementing partners. PIU has not been clear 
enough on these issues, and the timeframe of the actual events was affected by the slow 
funding process. It is probable that some of the delay was caused by slow reporting back from 
the implementing partners, as these have their own routines and standards for accounting. The 
partners forming the Mama Misitu Campaign coalition vary considerably with regard to 
focus, professionalism and procedures for reporting within their own organisation. Additional 
reporting for the Mama Misitu project came as a supplementary workload. At the same time 
the PIU has been under pressure to comply, not leaving the local partners sufficient time for 
working on the implementation. “Some concerns have been raised about ensuring that the PIU 
really does facilitate partners to implement, rather than implementing itself” (Williams 
2009:15).  
 
5.6.3 Support for the Mama Misitu campaign 
 
The approach of the Mama Misitu campaign is not to confront but rather to cooperate with the 
authorities. The PIU has successfully invested in obtaining good relations with central 
government. The campaign has thus benefited from a strong support from both FBD and the 
FSU. Their working relationship has included cooperation on intervention in illegal activities, 
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as the PIU would pass on such information received to the FBD for them to take action
41
. 
Also with regard to the implementation of PFM there has been good cooperation.  
 
A documentary film showing success stories of PFM has been developed and intended for 
educational purposes by both Mama Misitu and the FBD (Kahyarara 2009). In an evaluation 
report on PFM by the FBD, the Mama Misitu campaign is mentioned as an important 
initiative for raising awareness and creating understanding for good forest governance 
(Blomley and Iddi 2009:53). The sound co-operational connection is however based on good 
personal relationship with key employees within the department, and has not been formalised 
by any written agreements. This might be of some concern, especially in case of personnel 
changes (Williams 2009). Despite efforts by the Mama Misitu PIU, the campaign did not 
succeed in gaining support from the very top level of central government. Lack of cooperation 
from the MNRT blocked the attempts to gain access both to Prime Minister and the President 
of the United Republic of Tanzania (Williams 2009:15). 
 
At the district level, the government leaders were very supportive for the campaign. In Rufiji, 
the District Executive Director expressed that the Mama Misitu campaign was strongly 
complementary for the implementation of PFM, as the VFCs still were relatively weak and in 
need of support. She further believed that the campaign would improve the accountability and 
effort put down by district officers in law enforcement. The campaign was seen as an 
important tool to raise awareness of villagers and to report illegal forest use (Williams 2009).  
 
The Mama Misitu campaign has received less enthusiasm among District Natural Resource 
Staff (DNRS). Consultants questioned whether the DFOs were honest when saying they 
supported the campaign
42
. This group experienced pressure to perform both within law 
enforcement and to render services in relation with PFM, but the control only very limited 
resources. This unfeasibility may influence both their morale and professionalism. Local 
community members have also been raising allegations of district staff being associated with 
illegal activities (Williams 2009:15). The DFO in Kilwa whom I interviewed was well aware 
of the Mama Misitu campaign. Its‟ message was not new information, but acted as a 
reminder. Mama Misitu was using already existing networks to spread their mission. There 
had been a reduction in illegal logging after the start of the campaign, but this might also be 
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due to the export ban on logs. He emphasized also the lack of resources in the forest sector to 
be a major constraint to satisfactorily forest management. Poverty and the lack of alternative 
livelihood and access to affordable alternative energy sources were further mentioned as main 
challenges in order to improve forest conditions.  
 
To what extent the officials at the check point were supportive of the campaign is more 
uncertain. In one of my interviews
43
, increased awareness was presented as a problem, 
affecting their income opportunities negatively. Also in the evaluation report by the 
University of Dar Es Salaam, check point officials are claiming that there is more pressure on 
operators to comply with regulations within forest sector now, from the villages they pass, the 
districts where they operate, as well as from the central government (Kahyarara 2009).  
 
Traders of forest produce felt that they were often perceived as criminals. There are too many 
check points at which staff had different levels of understanding of harvest requirements. 
Even when transporting legal forest products they would sometimes be met by demands of 
bribes. Their opinion of the Mama Misitu campaign was mixed, but they expressed a desire to 
be included as stakeholders in the future campaign. Their knowledge and experience from 
other areas may contribute with valuable input in the effort to ensure effective forest 
management (Kahyarara 2009). 
 
5.7 Challenges for awareness raising campaigns 
 
Public pressure is generally more efficient than logic argumentation, evidence or policy 
papers in order to generate government response (HakiElimu web site)
44
. Awareness is 
generally recognised as precondition for public action. It is therefore of interest to look at 
awareness raising methods and what may be motivating for participation and public 
engagement. HakiElimu is a Tanzanian non-profit civil society organization whose focus is on 
public access to education, equality, human rights and democracy. They have wide experience 
in transmitting messages to ordinary citizens, and are often utilising mass media to stimulate 
citizens into taking informed action. HakiElimu was one of the CSOs consulted when 
designing the Mama Misitu campaign (Williams 2009).   
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 “Now there is this problem of awareness, it is less traffic and more of the papers are in order” - Interview with 
road check point officer 25.11.2009 
44
 http://www.hakielimu.org/ 
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Getting the message right and ways of transmission. 
When designing a message, average literacy rate and years of schooling of the target audience 
must be considered. By presenting information in accessible formats as cartoons, posters or 
illustrated story books you may reach a wider audience. People like humour and 
contradictions, and the message will obtain more attention by provoking than by preaching. 
Roadside billboards should contain short and catchy messages, readable in a glance. Public 
competitions, such as essay or drawing competitions, are popular and effective ways to gather 
public views and generate debate (HakiElimu web-site). Mass media, such as radio or TV 
spots, reach a large audience. The TV spots on forest crime produced by Mama Misitu 
generated good response from citizens all over Tanzania (Williams 2009). HakiElimu runs 
weekly a live program where leaders answer questions from citizens, and in this way are held 
accountable by ordinary people. These kinds of programs rely however on cooperation from 
the leaders.  
 
The Mama Misitu PIU aimed to obtain and publicise clear statements regarding corruption 
and moral values from top government leaders. This was however not feasible due to lack of 
cooperation (Williams 2009). The PIU attempted also to get newspapers to address issues 
covered by the campaign, by inviting 15 journalists 3 days out in the field. This effort resulted 
however in only 4 articles, all written by the same journalist (Williams 2009). I was explained 
following possible causes for this disappointing outcome; journalists in Tanzania are often 
poorly paid casual workers or freelancers, and it is frequently expected that they are 
remunerated both by the “subject” of an article and by the newspaper printing it. Bribes are 
not uncommon whether it is to write or not to write something. Articles describing situations 
in rural areas may get less attention than those dealing with issues in Dar es Salaam. Forest 
degradation or illegal logging has low news effect, it is rather regarded as a continuous 
problem. It might therefore have been more rewarding for the PIU to also address editors as 
they are the ones taking the decisions on what to publish
45
. HakiElimu is supporting 
journalists and editors who carry out independent research related to the organisation‟s main 
focus themes. The outcome of such support is both increased coverage and improved quality 
of the journalists work (HakiElime web site).  If the message is to be transmitted at both 
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national and local level, the message must be recognisable in order to gain synergetic effect. 
Participatory local adaptation of the message will in such cases be less optimal. 
 
Another challenge is to connect with the appropriate individuals when approaching a 
community. As stated in the FBD evaluation of PFM progression 2003;”The lesson is that 
sometimes those who attend the formal village meetings and consultations when PFM experts 
visit a village are people with little else to do, and perhaps nothing to do with forest and 
woodland management. Those with the greatest stake in forest management are often busy 
with other things, often in the forest. Women frequently fall into this group and consequently 
their interests are not effectively captured” (URT 2003:21). Introducing the project to the 
village leader on arrival may alleviate the abovementioned problem, but leaving the 
identification of participants solely to the village leadership may also increase the risk of elite 
capture. If information sharing isn‟t naturally encouraged within Tanzanian society, formal 
systems must be developed to ensure diffusion of information from participants to the wider 
community (URT 2003). 
 
Finally, donor dependence is a challenge that must be taken into consideration. Preferably 
dissemination of information should be based on inexpensive methods, allowing the campaign 
to run without interruption caused by funding delays. Unplanned discontinuities of activities 
can seriously affect the campaign‟s effectiveness (Williams 2009). The Mama Misitu 
campaign relies on expensive methods requiring coordination both at national and local level. 
TV spots and radio programmes are costly to produce, so are the merchandise which has been 
distributed in the villages. It is unlikely that the campaign can continue without further 
engagement by donors (Kahyarara 2009).    
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6 Conclusions  
 
In this study I have examined possible relationships between awareness and good forest 
governance. Main indicators have been the concepts of accountability, participation and law 
enforcement. Within all these concepts, power relations between stakeholders will be an 
influential factor either increasing or constraining each stakeholder‟s choice of action.  
 
Considering the limitations of my study elaborated in chapter 3.6, I am cautious to draw 
pretentious conclusions, but I will nevertheless summarise the findings I consider to be most 
important of my study. 
 
- First, I refer to the conservational value villagers seem to put on the forest. This is 
consistent with findings by Blomley and Iddi (2009). Underlying reasons may, 
however, not be so conservational, but rather reflect the delay in PFM 
implementation and lack of knowledge on regeneration rates or market value. 
Increased awareness on sustainable extraction of forest resources and the benefits 
of these may influence their perception of forest value. 
- Second, the majority of the villagers perceived corruption to be a local problem, 
affecting themselves and hindering development in their own village. Further, two 
thirds of the villagers were optimistic when it came to possible impacts they 
themselves could have on curbing corruption. This is not consistent with the more 
general perception that the poor view corruption as a vexing, but unalterable fact 
of life (Lough 2008). If my findings are representative, raising awareness at the 
local level may motivate villagers to engage against corruption. In order to avoid 
„powerless awareness‟ it is, however, important that independent or external actors 
or institutions are available to act on information received where local institutions 
are perceived as untrustworthy. 
- Third, I will point to the strong sense of ownership villagers seemed to have over 
the forest. The sense of ownership seemed equally strong in the village that had 
implemented CBFM as in the village where they still were in the process of doing 
so.  If this reflects the general situation, raising awareness on forest governance 
issues such as transparency and accountability, may motivate villagers to put 
pressure on their local government to act accordingly. 
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Assuming that these finding are representative, villagers may benefit from increased 
awareness on several issues. Seen in the context of governance, I can summarize my thesis as 
follows; 
 
Awareness and participation.  
In the process of establishing PFM, awareness is a key factor to encourage representatives 
from all parts of the community to participate, either as VFC member or as members of the 
Village Assembly. By using their influence in the formation of by-laws and forest 
management plans, good routines of governance may be ensured. By participating, villagers 
will gain access to even more information, - entering into a positive spiral towards more equal 
power relations.  
 
Awareness and accountability 
Awareness by villagers in general will make it more difficult for elite or local leaders to 
capture benefits to the detriment of others. Likewise, increased awareness at the local level 
may help to prevent corrupt practices within forest governance. Informed villagers may more 
easily raise demands on transparency and accountability by the local authorities, and their 
demands will be more difficult to neglect. 
 
Awareness and law enforcement 
The legal framework related to forest governance seems adequate. The problem is rather a 
lack of implementation of existing laws
46
. Powerful actors may resist legal enforcement and 
with the lack of legal knowledge at local level this evasion goes unchallenged. As forest 
governance is decentralized to the village level, many studies predict that forest patrolling 
becomes more effective. Increased awareness could therefore lead to local pressure for 
improved law compliance. Further, increased awareness of existing laws would benefit the 
villagers in the wording of by-laws, making sure they don‟t violate national laws and thus end 
up with unenforceable legislation.  
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The Mama Misitu campaign 
By anchoring the Mama Misitu awareness raising campaign to national institutions and long 
standing civil society organisations in Tanzania, the campaign gained legitimacy and 
credibility. The campaign addresses well known problems, and obtained wide support from 
both the FBD as well as district government leaders. Apart from some critical comments on 
practical issues related to the implementation, all my key informants were positive to the 
Mama Misitu campaign. The implementation at the local level was handled by civil society 
organisations with extensive local knowledge and previous working experience in the area. 
All these factors may have led to the common perception of local ownership of the campaign, 
even though the planning and design of the campaign was undertaken centrally by a rather 
small group of professionals.  
 
A universal advice for the continuation of the campaign has been to strive for more 
participation from the various stakeholders early in the planning process for new activities. 
Considering the great challenges with regard to timing and coordination in order to gain 
synergy from running the campaign simultaneously at national and local level, it is probably a 
better strategy if selected districts through participatory planning could set up their own 
timetable of events, supported by information packages, campaign merchandise, and technical 
and professional assistance by the Mama Misitu PIU. This will probably reduce the synergy 
effects, but facilitate local participation and implementation. The campaign‟s policy to aim for 
cooperation rather than confrontation with government officials, has ensured a good working 
relationship with the government, but has also led to failure, i.e. when it comes to pursuing 
high ranking politicians to condemn corrupt behaviour. The advantages of maintaining a good 
relationship does, however, outweigh the negative consequences, especially when it comes to 
sharing of information, dialogue and legal enforcement.  It is further of vital importance that 
appropriate legal enforcement units will be allocated adequate resources for responding to 
information passed on by villagers on illegal forest activities. It is essential for the continuous 
engagement of villagers that they can trust the integrity and ability of the legal enforcement 
institutions. Likewise, the awareness campaign itself needs to secure its funding, possibly by 
building up a buffer of cash, in order to keep the activities running smoothly also during 
delays of transfers by donors.  
 
 
 
87 
 
Awareness and changes in power relations. 
Despite the effort to decentralize governance in the forest sector, substantial power remains 
with the district authorities. Foot-dragging in the enactment of by-laws and forest 
management plans, the holding of key positions in the harvesting committee and the slow 
reaction to act on forest offences, are examples of the continuous constraints on villagers‟ 
control over their forest resources. Whether this is a result of overstrained DFOs, limited 
resources, a reluctance by district authorities to hand over income opportunities to local level, 
or caused by personal motives such as reluctance to give up income possibilities by exploiting 
the inadequacies in the system, remains unclear. The reasons may be plural, but either way, by 
increasing VFC‟s awareness and competence on legal and management issues, they will be 
more able to defend their village‟s interests in interactions with the district authorities. 
Awareness of the market value of forest resources and how to approach market actors will 
further strengthen their position in relation to private companies or other external actors.  
 
Finally, to encourage villagers‟ participation in forest governance I believe eligible strategies 
for the distribution of forest related income to household level in a fair and justifiable way 
will be essential. If villagers personally benefit from good forest governance, they will also be 
more likely to pressure for transparency, accountability and law enforcement, and in this way 
hinder elite capture and contribute to strengthen local institutions and the systems around 
forest governance. Information endows power, and it is in the best interest for future forest 
governance if this is disseminated equally to all stakeholders. 
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Annex 1: List of interviewees 
 
Name:    Institution: 
 
Mtingwa, Rehema  Mama Misitu PIU, Campaign leader 
Kinyau, Nicholaus  Mama Misitu PIU, Field coordinator 
Ball, Steve   Mpingo Conservation Group, Implementing partner Kilwa 
Makala, Jasper  Mpingo Conservation Group, Implementing partner Kilwa 
Malugu, Isac   WWF Kilwa, Implementing partner Rufiji 
Mfangavo, Mustapha  Kilwa District, DFO 
Kiimu, Hadija R.  URT, MNRT, FBD, Assistant Director Utilization 
Kigula, Joseph  URT, MNRT, FBD 
Meshack, Charles  TFCG, Executive Director 
Sorensen, Carol (telephone) TFCG, Technical Advisor 
Sianga, Cassian  TNRF, Coordinator 
Fuglesang, Minou (telephone) Femina HIP, Director 
Chenga, Jumapili M.  TRAFFIC, Programme Officer 
Sundet, Geir   KPMG, Programme Director, Accountability in Tanzania 
Cooksey, Brian  Tanzania Development Research Group (TADREG) 
Kahyarara, Godius  University of Dar es Salaam, Department of Economics 
Williams, Andrew  Independent consultant, former coordinator TNRF 
Mäkelä, Merja   Embassy of Finland, Dar es Salaam 
Milledge, Simon  Embassy of Norway, Dar es Salaam 
Jørgensen, Ivar  Embassy of Norway, Dar es Salaam 
Jansen, Eirik   NORAD 
 
Also: 
Attending the presentation of the Mama Misitu Evaluation report at the Finnish Embassy, 10.12.2009 
Interviews with two employees at the Migeregere road check point 25.11.2009 
Focus group discussion with member of the VFC Ruhatwe village 24.11.2009 
Interviews with three members of the VFC Mavuji village 25.11.2009 
Interviews with 31 villagers in the Ruhatwe, Mavuji and Nyamwage villages, 24, 25, and 
29.11.2009 
Unsuccessfully trying to interview Pius Cheche, Bio-shape plantations, Kilwa 
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Annex 2: The Mama Misitu Partners 
 
Africare 
Formed in 1970, Africare works to improve the quality of life in Africa. Africare works in 
partnership with African communities to achieve healthy and productive societies through 
capacity building of local institutions. Africare-Tanzania ensures that all its projects involve 
participation and input from the „grassroots- level‟, as well as support and governance from 
local bodies, skills training, and instruction for future sustainability.  
http://www.africare.org/our-work/where-we-work/tanzania/ 
 
 
Care Tanzania 
Care Tanzania began operations in1994 in response to the massive arrival of Rwandan 
refugees, providing food, water, sanitation, shelter and health care to some 500 000 people. 
Since 1996, Care Tanzania has built a large development programme, reaching poor 
communities in several districts in the country. Their aim is to improve access to quality 
education, fight HIV and AIDS, improve health care, improve nutrition and distribute food to 
vulnerable populations, and preserve the environment. 
http://www.careinternational.org.uk/?lid=11062 
 
FARM-Africa 
FARM-Africa started work in Tanzania in 1990 and is an international NGO that aims to 
reduce poverty in Eastern and Southern Africa. FARM-Africa works in partnership with 
marginal farmers and herders, providing training and support that poor rural 
communities need in order to manage their resources sustainably and effectively.  Families 
are directly assisted to help work themselves out of poverty through improved ways to 
manage their crops, livestock, forests and access to water.  
http://www.farmafrica.org.uk/ 
 
Femina HIP 
Femina HIP is a multimedia civil society edutainment and sexual health initiative. Femina 
HIP aims to create a media platform enabling people to express themselves, share 
experiences, and learn. The media products include: Fema magazine, Si Mchezo! magazine, 
Fema TV Talk Show and the chezasalama.com website. Their target audience is youth aged 
15-25, and their magazines are distributed free of charge to secondary schools, civil society 
organisations, local governments and work places. Through this mix of mediums, Femina HIP 
aims to enhance positive and democratic public debate, stimulate critical thinking and 
personal responsibility, and contribute to behaviour and social change in Tanzania. 
 
 
Journalists Environmental Association of Tanzania (JET) 
JET was established in 1991 and is an environmental NGO watchdog dedicated to raise public 
awareness on sustainable management of natural resources. JET collects information, 
provides forums and carries out field research and education programmes on environment and 
sustainable development and disseminates it through JET publications and other media so as 
to enable Tanzanians, especially rural people to be aware of the need for environment 
conservation. 
http://www.jettanz.org/ 
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Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team (LEAT) 
Established in 1994 the Lawyers' Environmental Action Team is the first public interest 
environmental law organization in Tanzania. Its mission is to ensure sound natural resource 
management and environmental protection in Tanzania. LEAT carries out policy research, 
advocacy, and selected public interest litigation. Its membership largely includes lawyers 
concerned with environmental management and democratic governance in Tanzania.  
www.leat.or.tz 
 
Shirikisho la Mitandao ya Jamii ya Usimamizi wa Misitu Tanzania (MJUMITA) 
The Tanzania Community Forest Conservation Network is a network of community based 
organisations involved in Participatory Forest Management across Tanzania. MJUMITA was 
established in 2000. The network advocates for improved application of participatory forest 
management across the country. The network has over 5000 members.  
 
Mpingo Conservation Project (MPC)   
The Mpingo Conservation Project offers a unique opportunity for integrated conservation and 
rural development across large areas of habitat in Tanzania and Mozambique. The aim of the 
Mpingo Conservation Project is to use Mpingo as an economic tool to advance conservation 
of mpingo‟s natural habitat; Miombo woodland. In 2010 the group changed their name to the 
Mpingo Conservation & Development Initiative. 
http://www.mpingoconservation.org/kilwa_district.html 
 
Policy Forum 
Policy Forum is a network of NGOs. Currently this growing network has over 50 Tanzanian 
member organisations. Its‟ aim is to influence policy processes to enhance poverty reduction, 
equity and democratization.  They further aim to increase informed civil society participation 
in decisions and actions that determine how policies affect ordinary Tanzanians, particularly 
the most disadvantaged. 
www.policyforum.or.tz 
 
Tanzania Association of Foresters (TAF) 
TAF was established in 1976. They have over 900 members, many of them holding expertise 
and experiences in forestry, beekeeping, environmental management, and wildlife and natural 
resource management. Most of the members come from higher learning and research 
institutions, the Government, and NGOs. TAF aims to disseminate forest information and 
foster public interest on forest issues, as well as promoting all aspects of forestry in 
cooperation with other organisations. The Association has carried out numerous studies, 
assessments and developed plans related to natural resource conservation, sustainable 
utilization and policy development. 
www.taftz.org/aboutus.html 
 
Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (TFCG) 
TFCG is a Tanzanian national NGO whose mission is to conserve and restore the biodiversity 
of globally important forests in Tanzania for the benefit of the present and future generations. 
For the last 25 years TFCG has been actively involved in promoting the conservation of the 
coastal forests. 
http://www.tfcg.org/index.html 
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Tanzania Natural Resource Forum (TNRF) 
Tanzania Natural Resource Forum (TNRF) is a collective civil society-based initiative to 
improve renewable natural resource management in Tanzania. They address fundamental 
issues of governance such as transparency, accountability and local empowerment, by 
bringing together a diverse range of stakeholders and interests to share information, build 
collaboration and pool resources towards a common aim of better and devolved natural 
resource management. 
http://www.tnrf.org/ 
TRAFFIC Tanzania 
Operating in Tanzania since 1995, much of TRAFFIC East/Southern Africa‟s (TESA) work 
involves creating awareness and influencing policy decisions about important trade, use and 
environment issues, building capacity within government institutions to deal proactively with 
these issues, and working with other NGOs, research institutions and local communities to 
find solutions to pressing livelihood issues that currently impact negatively upon species or 
ecosystems of concern. 
www.traffic.org 
 
 
Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) 
WCS has been working in Tanzania for 50 years to help the country safeguard its unique 
global heritage. More than 130 projects have been supported, encompassing training, 
research, monitoring, institutional support, education, and the gazettement and extension of 
Tarangire, Ruaha, Serengeti and Kitulo National Parks. 
 
World Conservation Union (IUCN) 
IUCN was founded in 1948 and brings together over 1000 organisational members and some 
10000 experts from 181 countries in a unique worldwide partnership. Its mission is to 
influence, encourage and assist societies throughout the world to conserve the integrity and 
diversity of nature and to ensure that any use of natural resources is equitable and ecologically 
sustainable. In Tanzania IUCN is working with partners and stakeholders to improve forest 
governance. 
 
Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania (WCST) 
Founded in 1988, the Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania‟s mission is to work towards 
the conservation of the flora, fauna, and environment of Tanzania for the benefit of mankind. 
Since its founding, WCST has been involved in a wide array of conservation activities at local 
and national levels. 
 
World Wide Fund for Nature – Tanzania Programme Office (WWF-TPO) 
The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) has experience from Tanzania since 1962.  In 1990 
the WWF-Tanzania Programme Office was established. Concerned about the preservation of 
Miombo woodlands, WWF is working with local communities, governments and NGOs, 
encouraging the use of natural resources in a more sustainable way. Their objectives are to 
increase the local population‟s participation in natural resource management and to secure a 
non-discriminatory access to forest produce, as well as promoting alternative livelihoods  
www.panda.org/who_we_are/wwf_offices/tanzania 
 
 
(Sources: Information brief from Mama Misitu and the various web-sites referred to above.) 
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Annex 3: Questionnaire villagers  
 
31 respondents. 
 
1 Age    Frequency male/female 
- 19     1  f 
- 22     1  m 
- 25     1  m 
- 26     1  m  
- 27     1  f 
- 29     1  m 
- 30     1  m 
- 32     2  f, f 
- 33     1  f 
- 34     1  f 
- 35     3  f, f, f  
- 38     1  m 
- 40     3  f, f, f 
- 42     1  m 
- 47     1  f 
- 49     1  m 
- 50     1  f 
- 59     1  m 
- 60     1  f 
- 64     1  m 
- 65     1  m 
- 66     2  m, m 
- 68     1  m 
- 72     1  m 
- Don‟t know    1  f 
 
Some of the respondents did not know their age. They would go and get their 
identity card and show me. 
 
 
2 Educational level        Frequency 
- None:        3 
- Standard 2       1 
- Standard 3       1 
- Standard 4       3 
- Standard 6       1 
- Standard 7      14 
- Form 2       1 
- Form 4       4 
- Adult education      1 
- Quaran school       2 
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3 Employment 
- Farmer       24 
- Witch doctor        2 
- Teacher       1  
- Carpenter       1  
- Business person       1 
- Cook        1 
- Unemployed       1 
  
 
 
    
4 Do you think forest conservation is important?              
All respondents answered Yes. 
Why? (multiple answers possible) 
- Water catchment     22 
- Conserve environment    13 
- Shelter for wild animals    12 
- Provide timber/building materials   12 
- Fresh air       5 
- Provide firewood      4 
- Preserve for next generation     3 
- Good for soil (catchment/fertilizer)    3 
- Protect trees       3 
- Provide medicine      3 
- Avoid disasters      2  
- Good for climate      2 
- Provide shadow      1 
- Protect bees       1 
- Provide meat       1 
- Provide fruits       1 
- Charcoal from remains     1 
- Communities live in peace     1 
- Don‟t know       1   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
98 
 
 
 
5 Which resources do your household extract from the forest? In a few cases 
where firewood and charcoal was not mentioned we added a question about the 
main energy source of the household, which then added these two resources to the 
list. 
- Firewood      31 
- Building materials     21 
- Charcoal      20 
- Timber for furniture (bed, table, chair)  15 
- Medicine      11 
- Fruits       11 
- Honey        9 
- Meat        9 
- Grass for roofing      9 
- Mushrooms       6 
- Water        4 
- Hamp        3 
- Stones        2 
- Grass for making mats     1 
- Tourism       1 
- Charcoal for sale      1 
- Fertilizers       1 
 
 
6 Are you aware of any logging activity near your village? 
Yes (13), No (13), Not sure (5). 
 
7 Do you know if this activity has obtained the necessary permits? 
- Don‟t know           3 
- Yes it is legal          5  
- Yes it is illegal      5 
- It is villagers harvesting      9 
- Others are harvesting      4 
 
8 Do you trust the local forest committee to manage the forest to the best 
interest of your community? 
Yes (25), No (5), Don‟t know (1). Of those answering No, it was added: They 
serve more their own interest (2), they are logging illegally themselves (1) and It is 
not easy for them to control (1). 
  
9 Do you think it is OK to pay a small fee to the authorities in order to speed up 
the process of a request? 
Yes (30), No (1). Some of the yes answers even added that it was good. 
 
10 Do you believe corruption is a problem in the forest sector? 
Yes (28), No (2), Don‟t know (1). 
 
11 Do you believe nepotism and favourism is a problem in the forest sector? 
Yes (20), No (8), Don‟t know (3) 
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12 Do you believe a person engaging in corruption or illegal logging is immoral? 
Yes (30), Don‟t know (1) 
 
13 Do you reflect upon that corruption and nepotism is an obstruction to 
development in Tanzania? How? 
Yes (29), No (2) 
 
14 Have you ever been requested to pay a bribe when dealing with someone from 
the forest sector? 
Yes (2), No (29) 
 
15 Whom do you believe is most corrupt: (the following options were listed) 
- Central Government officials    7    
- Local government officials    11     
- Politicians 
- Staff at road check points     9 
- Forest inspectors      8 
- Hammering personnel     1 
- Issuing officers for harvest permits   3 
- Issuing officers for export certificate 
- Port/export harbour personnel 
- Village leaders      8 
- Local Business people     8 
- Foreign business people 
- International institutions 
- NGOs 
- Ordinary people      1 
- Others (please state)  
- All of them      1 
- Traffic police      1 
  Don‟t know anything about corruption   6 
 
16 Who do you think the forest sector should be accountable to? 
- Local community/villagers    19 
- Village Forest Committee     5 
-  Mpingo Conservation Group     1 
- Village leader, village executive officer   2 
- Local government      7 
-  Someone from outside the community   1 
- Hamlet leader       1 
- Forest inspectors      1 
- Road check point officers     1 
- District Forest Officer      1 
- Don‟t know       2 
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17 Have you heard about Mama Misitu?  
Yes (25), No (6) 
 
If yes; what is their mission? 
- Create awareness of forest value   10 
- Stop cutting trees down     7 
- How to make sustainable forest for next generation  3 
- Awareness on how to protect the forest  18 
- If trees are cut, must plant new    2 
- Mobilize people to protect their forest   2 
- Not burn/set fire to the forest     1 
- Awareness about the effect of destroying the forest  1 
- Don‟t know their mission     3 
 
If yes; where/how did you hear about it? 
- Village meeting      7 
- Seminar       5 
- Drama group      11 
- Choir        2 
- Video shows       4 
- TV-spots       1 
- Radio        1 
- T-shirts, Khangas, Caps     6 
- Signboard       4 
- Leaflets       1 
- Heard from other villagers     1 
 
18 Do you believe this campaign will manage to change the attitude of corrupt 
officers? 
Yes (13), No (5), Don‟t know (13) 
 
19 Do you believe the campaign will help raise awareness? 
Yes (18), No (o), Don‟t know (12), Must repeat – once is not enough (1) 
 
20 Have you experience with other NGOs/campaigns raising awareness on forest 
issues earlier? 
Yes (19), No (12),  
- Mpingo Conservation Group     2 
- Vunjuvunja Sasaa Group     2 
- Choirs        1 
- Utumi         1 
- Radio        1 
- Tujilinde       1 
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21 Do you believe villagers may have an impact when it comes to curbing 
corruption?  
Yes (21), No (6), Don‟t know (3). One woman would not answer this question as 
the village leader had come within ear shot. 
 
How? (some examples) 
- Yes, by taking them to the village executive officer and then to the police and 
report them 
- Information and less secrecy can help so everyone get their right 
- Corruption does so that you can be taken to court without having done 
anything. They will not believe what you say. But with education it may help, 
but some cannot be educated or helped at all. 
- Instead of taking bribes they should report when seeing illegal activities. 
- Yes, but they need assistance from outside, central government or even from 
abroad. 
- Yes, when they see someone corrupt, they can join forces and take him to the 
village executive office or even the police. 
- They must get educated, because then they will see the importance of the forest 
and follow up on it. 
- Yes, if people can cooperate they can fight corruption 
- Yes, by using local meetings, give instructions and by-laws. 
- Yes, if we deny paying little money and follow the rules and instructions. Then 
there will be no need for corruption. 
  
22 Do you think it is possible to curb corruption? 
Yes (17), No (9), Don‟t know (3), Can reduce it (2). 
 
 
 
 
